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Wireless networks have gained popularity, providing users flexibility and mobility in 
accessing information. The IEEE 802.11 Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) 
standard has become the dominant architecture in practice. Private WLANs are used 
by businesses and home users, while public WLANs have been established in areas 
expected to have high demand for bandwidth, such as cafes, airports, and hotels. 
 
Existing solutions for such WLAN access networks have been exposed to security 
vulnerabilities. Although researchers have proposed improved security for WLANs, 
very little work exists in the area of understanding the interaction between WLANs 
and their emerging and evolving security architectures with respect to the 
performance impacts of these security measures. The aim of this thesis is to quantify 
the impact on network performance resulting from the adoption of these security 
mechanisms. 
 
This study investigated the performance and security issues of IEEE 802.11 wireless 
networks using layered security models. The two models defined in the research were 
the IEEE 802.1X and Virtual Private Network (VPN). Our results showed that 
different security mechanisms degraded WLAN performance in different ways. 
Network performance degradation increased as the protection of the security 
mechanisms increased. Furthermore, the VPN model impacted the performance more 
than the 802.1X model. The performance degradation calculated was incorporated 
into constructing a wireless security policy template for wireless “security insurance”. 
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
Wireless networks are emerging as a significant aspect of networking; wireless local 
area networks (WLANs, see Acronyms and Abbreviations), Bluetooth, and cellular 
systems have become increasingly popular in the business and computer industry, 
with consequent security issues. WLANs, especially the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 networks, are becoming common access 
networks in private and public environments. The freedom of movement and 
simplicity in its implementation have made WLANs popular in the home and 
businesses sectors, as well as hotspots 1  such as airports and cafes. The increasing 
availability of, and therefore increasing reliance on, wireless networks makes it 
extremely important to maintain reliable and secure communications in the wake of 
network component failures or security breaches. However, recent news reports on a 
number of attacks against wireless networks, especially WLANs, have alarmed 
wireless adopters, developers, and intended users. The broadcast nature of wireless 
communication links makes them unique in their vulnerability to security attacks and 
their susceptibility to intentional threats. Organisations that want to deploy a secured 
WLAN infrastructure are challenged by the flaws in the existing wireless mechanism 
design, such as the wired equivalent privacy (WEP) protocol. 
 
Although researchers have proposed improved security for WLANs, very little  work 
exists in the area of understanding the interaction between WLANs and their 
emerging and evolving security architectures with respect to the performance impact 
of these security measures.  
 
This study investigated the performance and security issues of IEEE 802.11 wireless 
networks using layered security models. These models, such as 802.1X and virtual 
private network (VPN), were selected from a variety of proposed security 
mechanisms. This study consisted of a performance evaluation with layered security 
                                                 
1 Hotspots are a form of public WLAN allowing users to access Internet from any WLAN structures. 
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implementations to provide us with a set of possible operating and management 
parameters. These parameters would be incorporated into secure wireless network 
management policies.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
The industry accepts security mechanisms such as encryption, authentication, and 
other techniques as requirements in a wired network. However, there is very little 
information on the performance costs associated with implementing these processes in 
a wireless network. Furthermore, there is no analysis on how well a wireless network 
integrates with traditional security mechanisms such as a firewall, authentication, and 
encryption.  
 
The practicality of any security policy depends on whether that policy is enforceable 
and at what cost. Prior research has emphasised mechanisms to enforce network 
security, yet the importance of security “cost” on performance and management has 
not been evaluated. The aim of this research is to determine performance and security 
issues in wireless networks, and to identify vulnerabilities in the operation of IEEE 
802.11 WLANs. 
 
In order to evaluate the impact of security on performance, a testbed was setup to 
assess existing security technologies and their effects on network performance. File 
transfer protocol (FTP) and hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) are the common 
application protocols used for data transfer, and were evaluated in conjuction with 
various security mechanisms. This thesis quantified important performance variables 
which included response time and throughput fo r the various application protocols.  
1.3 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to existing wireless networks. A detailed analysis 
of the structure and protocols used for IEEE 802.11b is presented. Chapter 3 discusses 
security threats and mechanisms to mitigate such risks. Various security architectures, 
ranging from existing 802.11 and 802.1X standards; authentication, authorisation, 
and accounting (AAA) infrastructure; and VPN components are examined. Chapter 4 
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provides a brief overview of the performance requirements and discusses prior 
research carried out to evaluate network performance. 
 
Chapter 5 explains the goals that drove the research, the derived requirements, and the 
way that different security mechanisms were constructed to carry out the experiments. 
Chapter 6 presents the model and system architectures; it provides readers with the 
structure of the experiments. 
 
Chapter 7 analyses the data collected during the experiments. Various performance 
evaluations were carried out on interaction between different models, traffic types, 
and security level interactions. A wireless security strategy treating security policies 
as “insurance policies” is proposed in Chapter 8. Scenarios of how security and 
performance can be incorporated into an insurance policy are given. Chapter 9 
concludes our findings and indicates directions for future work. 
 
Appendix A provides an extract of the data collected from our experiments. The 
operation of system architecture and security mechanisms used for WLAN is 
demonstrated in Appendix B. Appendix C describes the various formations of the 
remote access policies used in the experiments. Finally, acronyms and abbreviations 




Wireless technologies enable freedom of mobility for users by releasing the constraint 
of physical connections – network connections become cable-free. Wireless 
technologies use radio frequency (RF) as the medium of transmission, and allow 
organisations to eliminate cables for simpler network management at effective costs. 
The technologies range from complex systems, such as WLANs and cellular 
networks, to simple devices such as wireless headphones.  
 
In this chapter, a brief overview of different wireless networks is presented, followed 
by an in-depth discussion of the 802.11 standards and other requirements for wireless 
networks, such as roaming. The experimental portion of this thesis is however limited 
to 802.11 and focuses on the infrastructure mode.  
2.1 Wireless Networks 
Wireless networking comprises different wireless technologies ranging from wireless 
wide area network (WWAN), and wireless local area network (WLAN), to wireless 
personal area network (WPAN). These wireless technologies transmit data over 
different radio frequency bands and speeds to provide different degrees of mobility 
(Figure 2-1, adapted from Chevillat and Schott [2001]).  
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Bluetooth,  802.15, 
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Figure 2-1 Overview of Wireless Networks  
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2.1.1 Wireless WANs 
A WWAN is a computer network that extends over a large geographical area. 
Characteristically, a WWAN receives and transmits data using radio signals over an 
interconnection with a mobile computer system. At the mobile switching centre, 
WWAN segments then connect to either a specialised public or private network via 
telephone or other high-speed communication link. These back-hauls interconnect and 
then link to an organisation’s existing LAN/WAN infrastructure. Recent 
developments allow direct connections to generic public networks, such as the 
Internet, further reducing the cost of deployment. WWANs are normally measured in 
kilometers, and their data throughput rates are a great deal slower than WLAN 
connections (typically measured in tens of thousands of bytes per second or slower). 
The average access speed can be slower than a 28.8 Kbps modem connection. In 
general, wireless networks are also more susceptible to environmental factors, such as 
weather, than wired networks. 
 
WWANs encompass a variety of standards. The Advanced Mobile Phone Systems 
(AMPS) standard, which governed first-generation (1G) mobile telephone devices, 
allowed interoperable wireless network infrastructure among vendors. The AMPS 
standard uses Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) and requires a great deal 
of bandwidth while operating in the 824–829 MHz range. Other telephony standards 
include the Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) standard, and the Code Division 
Multiple Access (CDMA) standard. Existing second-generation (2G) digital cellular 
systems are Global System for Mobile (GSM) in Europe, and Personal Digital 
Communication (PDC) in Japan. General Packet Radio System (GPRS) belongs to 
GSM 2.5G. The 2G to 2.5G wireless WANs provides data rate from 9.6 Kbps to 348 
Kbps. As for third-generation (3G) systems, Universal Mobile Telecommunication 
System (UMTS) is one of the major systems aiming for higher capacity and data rates 
with global mobility, and operates around 144 Kbps to 2 Mbps [Hannikainen et al., 
2002]. 
2.1.2 Wireless LANs 
WLANs provide greater flexibility and scalability than traditional LANs. Unlike a 
wired LAN, which requires a wire to access the network, a WLAN facilitates network 
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transmissions of data from computers and other components through an access point 
(AP). An AP typically provides a range (cell or area coverage) of 100 metres. IEEE 
802.11 is an international standard providing transmission speeds ranging from 1 
Mbps to 54 Mbps in either the 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz frequency bands. The 802.11b is the 
dominant WLAN technology at present [WECA, 2001b], and provides an expected 
data throughput of 5.5 Mbps [Computer Society, 2001; Gast, 2002]. Section 2.2 
discusses the 802.11 standard in more detail. 
 
High performance radio LAN (HiperLAN [2002]) is a European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI) standard operating in the 5 GHz frequency band; 
HiperLAN/1 has a transmission speed of 19 Mbps, while HiperLAN/2 operates at 54 
Mbps. HiperLAN/2 supports quality of service (QoS) and is based on an infrastructure 
topology, whereas HiperLAN/1 is more suitable for forming ad-hoc networks. 
2.1.3 Wireless PANs 
WPAN technology emphasises low cost and low power consumption, usually at the 
expense of range and peak speed. WPANs typically provide a maximum range of 10 
meters, facilitating communication between laptops, cell phones, and personal digital 
assistants (PDAs). The best-known WPAN technology, Bluetooth, operates in the 2.4 
GHz frequency band at 1 Mbps [SIG, 2000]. Bluetooth users can expect a maximum 
available speed of approximately 700 Kbps. IEEE 802.15 was formed with a similar 
goal to Bluetooth. It aims at very low power consumption, and operates at 10 meters 
with data rates less than 1 Mbps. The 802.15 WPAN standard targets interoperability 
between WPAN devices, and devices meeting the IEEE 802.11 standard 
[Hannikainen et al., 2002]. Research is in process to provide WPAN with higher 
transmission rates up to 10 Mbps, including the development of Bluetooth 2 and IEEE 
802.15 task group (TG) 3. 
 
HomeRF [2002] is another WPAN technology operating over a common wireless 
interface at 1-, 2-, and 10-Mbps data rates in the 2.4 GHz band for wireless digital 
communication between PCs and consumer electronic devices for home and small 
businesses. Infrared communication is limited due to line-of-sight requirements 
between the transmitter and the receiver.  
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2.2 IEEE 802.11 Standards 
The IEEE ratified the 802.11 standard in October 1997 [IEEE Std. 802.11b, 1999], 
and revised it in March 1999. The standard provides three physical (PHY) layers and 
one medium access control (MAC) layer for deploying wireless communication in 
local networks (Figure 2-2, adapted from Held [2001]). As for the logical link control 
(LLC) layer, there is no difference between wireless (802.11) and wired (802) LANs, 
such as the IEEE 802.3 Ethernet network. The MAC protocol provides two service 
types (see Section 2.2.3): asynchronous using the distributed coordination function 
(DCF), and synchronous using the point coordination function (PCF) that is 
contention-free. 
 
Logical link control (LLC)
Point coordination function
(PCF)












































Figure 2-2 The 802.11 Protocol Stack  
The 802.11 standard is a family of specifications originally providing a 1 to 2 Mbps 
data transmission rate using either the frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) or 
direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS); see Section 2.2.2 for more detail. After 
revisions, the standard includes 802.11a, operating in a 5 GHz frequency band at 54 
Mbps, and 802.11b and IEEE 802.11g, operating in a 2.4 GHz frequency band at 
speeds of 11 Mbps and 54 Mbps, respectively [O'Hara & Petrick, 1999].  
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The 802.11 standard takes advantage of radio spectrum technologies, allowing 
multiple users to share the radio frequencies without end-user licenses. Specifically, it 
makes uses of the 2.4 GHz Industrial, Scientific, and Medical band (ISM) band for 
802.11 and 802.11b networks, and the 5 GHz Unlicensed National Information 
Infrastructure (UNII) band for 802.11a-based networks. The International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) defines both bands. However, interference issues 
remain, especially in the 2.4 GHz band; if the technology interferes with an authorised 
operation such as an airline radio frequency, it will cease to operate. In addition, there 
is no protection from other technologies, such as Bluetooth, accessing 802.11 
frequencies. 
2.2.1 Architecture Components 
The architecture of 802.11 is composed of cells, which can overlap. The basic service 
set (BSS) represents the coverage area of an individual cell, and outside the BSS, a 
station (STA, such as a mobile client) cannot communicate with stations in this cell. 
The 802.11 standards operate in two modes (Figure 2-3, adapted from ANSI/IEEE 
802.11 Std. [1999]): infrastructure mode (also known as BSS), and ad-hoc mode or 
independent BSS (IBSS).  
 
The ad-hoc mode is composed solely of clients within a mutual communication range 
via the wireless medium; it is formed in a spontaneous manner and exists for a limited 
time in a small area. Examples of ad-hoc networks include rescue operations, 
conferences, and military operations. The coverage area is composed of the 
overlapping coverage area of each client. 
Access Point
Ad-Hoc Mode Infrastructure Mode
IBSS BSS
 
Figure 2-3 Ad-Hoc and Infrastructure Modes 
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In the infrastructure mode, all wireless clients’ communications are passed through a 
central station, an AP, which manages the network flow and access. The AP provides 
functionality similar to that provided by a base station in other cellular networks 
because it acts as a bridge between the wireless segment and the wired segment. This 
architecture allows for the interconnection of several (infrastructure) BSSs, which 
form an extended service set (ESS, see Figure 2-4; adapted from [ANSI/IEEE Std. 
802.11, 1999]). An ESS is built by connecting several APs through a backbone 
network called a distribution system (DS). For example, an 802.3 or Ethernet segment 
is a DS. The AP defines the coverage area. A portal is a logical point, which is 
required to integrate the 802.11 architecture with existing wired LANs facilitating the 










Figure 2-4 ESS 
2.2.2 Physical Layers  
The physical layer processes data to and from radio signals over the airwave. In other 
words, it handles the transmission of the frame via the air interface. The standards 
define five alternative physical layers (Figure 2-2): 
 Frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS)  
 Direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) 
 High-rate direct sequence spread spectrum (HR/DSSS) 
 Orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) 
 Infrared (IR) 
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The first three physical layers belong to radio spread spectrum technology that 
operates in the 2.4 GHz band, while OFDM operates in the 5 GHz band. IR operates 
in the 300-428 GHz band and operates at a slow speed with line-of-sight connection. 
IR has become a legacy protocol thus will not be addressed in this discussion. 
2.2.2.1 FHSS 
FHSS modulates data signals with a carrier signal that hops from one frequency to 
another, using time as its measurement, over a wide range of frequencies. The carrier 
frequency (between 2.4 and 2.483 GHz) is changed periodically to avoid collisions. A 
collision occurs only when both a narrowband system and the spread spectrum signals 
are transmitting at the same frequency simultaneously. A hopping code is used to 
decide the order of data transmission and which frequency to hop to. FHSS provides a 
maximum data transmission speed of 2 Mbps. 
2.2.2.2 DSSS and HR/DSSS 
DSSS combines a data signal at the sending station with a higher data rate bit 
sequence, known as the chipping code or processing gain. This chipping code reduces 
interferences by dividing the user data according to a spreading ratio, enabling a faster 
data transmission rate of 11 Mbps. It sets a specific string of bits to be sent for each 
data bit. A redundant bit pattern is included in the chipping code to increase resistance 
to interference.  
2.2.2.3 OFDM 
For 802.11a, OFDM modulation is used instead of the spread spectrum technologies, 
with the intention of providing less interference. This method supports a high 
transmission speed of 54 Mbps. It splits a radio signal into multiple smaller sub-
signals that are transmitted simultaneously at different frequencies (multi-carrier), 
thus reducing the amount of crosstalk (electronic interference) during transmission. 
Task Group 802.11h focuses on improving the spectrum managed in 802.11a-based 
networks. 
2.2.3 MAC Layer 
The 802.11 specifications provide asynchronous (DCF) and contention-free (PCF) 
services. The asynchronous service is always available whereas the contention-free 
service is optional. DCF implements the basic access method of the 802.11 MAC 
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protocol; the carrier senses multiple accesses with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) 
for path sharing. This service was used in our experiments later in the thesis. 
 
The PCF provides contention-free service, which implements a polling access method 
[ANSI/IEEE. Std 802.11, 1999]. It uses a point coordinator (PC), usually the AP, 
which cyclically polls stations, giving them the opportunity to transmit. Thus the 
access priority provided by a PCF may be utilised to create a contention-free access 
method. The PC controls the frame transmissions of the stations in order to eliminate 
contention for a limited period of time. Unlike the DCF, the implementation of the 
PCF is not mandatory. Furthermore, the PCF itself relies on the asynchronous service 
provided by the DCF (see Figure 2-2).  
 
All physical layers support one common MAC layer. Task Group 802.11e focuses on 
enhancing the MAC layer for QoS. 
2.2.4 Standards and Data Rates 
The 802.11 protocols offer two data rate standards, 802.11a and 802.11b, and one 
work- in-progress data rate standard, 802.11g. Table 2-1 compares the differences 
among these standards. 
 
Interoperability between different 802.11 vendor products is tested and certified by 
the Wi-Fi Alliance (formerly the Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance, WECA2). 
2.2.4.1 802.11a  
IEEE Std. 802.11a [1999] was built for the wireless asynchronous transfer mode 
(ATM), and operates in the 5 GHz to 6 GHz band. Its OFDM offers a bandwidth of 
300 MHz at shorter distances (than 802.11b), and the 802.11 standard defines three 
types of data rate:  
 6 Mbps using binary phase shift keying for encoding, 
 12 Mbps using quadrature phase shift keying, and 
 24 Mbps using 16- level quadrature amplitude modulation encoding. 
 
                                                 
2 See www.wi-fi.org for more information. 
 12
However, the de facto standard appears to be 54 Mbps with 64- level quadrature 
amplitude modulation. 
2.2.4.2 802.11b  
IEEE Std. 802.11b [1999] is known as Wi-Fi or 802.11 High Rate, providing a 2.4 
GHz ISM band with an 11 Mbps data transmission rate. It uses the HR/DSSS and 
complementary code keying (CCK) modulation in order to support higher speed 
transmission, and is less susceptible to the multipath-propogation interference. 
802.11b is backward compatible with 802.11. Its limitations include a bandwidth 
provision up to 83 MHz, and interference with other wireless technologies, such as 
microwave ovens, cordless phones, and Bluetooth.  
 
802.11a and 802.11b are compatible with each other, but with different frequencies (5 
GHz and 2.4 GHz, respectively). 802.11b is wireless Ethernet while 802.11a is 
wireless Fast Ethernet. 
2.2.4.3 802.11g  
Task Group 802.11g [TGg, 2002] is working on extending the 2.4 GHz band for a 
higher data rate of 20+ Mbps. The 802.11g standard is similar to 802.11b, and is thus 
backward compatible with it, with an improved transmission rate of 54 Mbps. It uses 
a combination of OFDM and CCK modulation. Because the radio transceiver uses 
RF-to-baseband, there is no need for an intermediate frequency. 
 
Characteristics 802.11a 802.11b 802.11g 
Frequency Band 5 GHz 2.4 GHz 2.4 GHz 
Data Rate (Mbps) 54 11 54 
Physical Layer OFDM HR/DSSS OFDM + CCK 
Operating Range Approximately 50 m indoors and 500 m outdoors 
(Throughput decreases with distance and network load) 
QoS 802.11e patched QoS 
Security WEP/802.11i proposed mechanisms 
Table 2-1 Comparisons of 802.11 Standards 
2.2.5 Communication Exchange 
The 802.11 standard specifies nine services to support frame delivery, access control 
and privacy. These nine services are authentication, association, deauthentication, 
disassociation, distribution, integration, privacy, reassociation, and frame delivery. 
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In an infrastructure network, wireless clients and APs must establish a relationship, or 
an association, prior to data communication. Only after an association is established 
can the two wireless stations exchange data. The synchronisation process is a two-step 
process involving three states: 
1. Unauthenticated and unassociated, 
2. Authenticated and unassociated, and 
3. Authenticated and associated. 
 
The process of a wireless client finding and associating with an AP is shown in Figure 
2-5. APs transmit a beacon management frame at fixed intervals, containing 
information such as network names (service set identifiers, SSID). To associate with 
an AP and join an infrastructure BSS, a client listens for beacon messages to identify 
the APs within range, which is also known as passive scanning. The client then selects 
a BSS to join. A client may also send a probe request management frame to find an 














Figure 2-5 Authentication and Association States 
After identifying an AP, the client and the AP perform authentication by exchanging 
several management frames as part of the process. The two standardised 
authentication mechanisms used are described in Section 3.1.1. After successful 
authentication, the client moves into the second state, authenticated and unassociated. 
Moving from the second state to the third and final state, authenticated and associated, 
involves the client sending an association request frame, and the access point 
responding with an association response frame. 
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2.3 Security  
The 802.11 standard provide two types of authentication: open system and shared key 
authentication (see Section 3.1.1 for details). The 802.11 standard also specifies an 
optional privacy method, the WEP protocol, to provide confidentiality for wireless 
communication.  
 
The open system authentication provides null security protection, while shared key 
authentication requires using the WEP protocol to provide access control. Details of 
how these mechanisms operate, and the weaknesses of WEP are discussed in Section 
3.2. 
2.4 Roaming and Handoff 
User mobility supports client stations moving freely from one cell to another. This is 
also known as roaming. Roaming requires the interaction between APs and DSs. A 
user can move from cell A to cell B by locating the AP in Cell B, and transferring 
credentials to that AP to maintain connection without reassociation. This scenario can 
involve reinitiating a search for an AP, in the same manner the client would when it is 
initialised, or other means, such as referencing a table built during the previous 
association [Convery & Miller, 2001]. To provide roaming between cells, APs need to 
provide effective handoff mechanisms. The 802.11 standard does not stipulate any 
particular mechanism for roaming; thus, it is up to each vendor to define an algorithm 
to assist its WLAN clients to make roaming decisions. While this provides greater 
flexibility in DS and AP functional design, the associated cost is that physical AP 
devices from different vendors are more likely to have interoperability issues. 
Roaming between different vendors’ APs can result in extended roaming times. 
Furthermore, how to maintain a user’s credential when users move to another cell 
without breaking the connection, and thus requiring reassociation and reauthentication 
by the new AP must be considered. Adding to this problem, specific vendor products 
may have different architectures for handoffs between APs, thus, the user credential 
handoff between different vendors must be determined. 
 
In the current 802.11 standard, for every frame transmitted, the receiving station 
responds with an acknowledgement (ACK) frame. Client stations use the ACK 
 15
messages as a means of determining how far from the access point they have moved. 
ACK frames and beacons (from APs) provide the client station with a reference point 
to determine whether a roaming decision needs to be made. If a set number of beacon 
messages are missed, the client can assume that it has roamed out of range of the 
access point with which it is currently associated. In addition, if expected ACK 
messages are not received, clients can also make the same assumption. 
 
The 802.11 workgroup [IEEE 802.11 WG, 2002] has recognised this problem by 
stating, “this limitation has become an impediment to WLAN market growth”. Task 
Group 802.11f [IEEE Std. 802.11/D3.1, 2002] has been set up to develop 
recommended practices for an inter-access point protocol (IAPP) that provides the 
necessary capabilities to achieve multi-vendor AP interoperability across a DS 
supporting 802.11 WLAN connections. This recommended practice specifies the 
information to be exchanged between APs, as well as with higher layer management 
entities (such as remote access dial-in user service [RADIUS] protocol) to support the 
802.11 DS functions based on the internet protocol (IP). Mobile IP provides the 
capability for supporting uninterrupted IP network connectivity when users roam. Lee 
[2002] examined several alternatives of Mobile IP and AAA integration to provide 
user roaming. 
 
Roaming and handoff are important issues in WLANs; however, the scope of this 
thesis is limited to a single cell design. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented an overview of different types of wireless technologies 
such as cellular networks, 802.11, and Bluetooth. Discussion in the chapter 
concentrated on the 802.11 WLAN architecture, which is the protocol used in the 
experiments (802.11b) for this study. Architectures, physical and MAC layers, data 
rates, and the communication exchange of the 802.11 standard were examined. 
Roaming considerations for WLANs were discussed, and it was noted that this 
research conducted only a single cell design testbed.  
 16
CHAPTER 3 
WLAN Security Technologies 
Wireless LANs have gained increasing market popularity in locations such as airports, 
cafés, universities, and businesses, but WLAN security remains an ongoing concern. 
The rapid deployment of WLANs has further emphasised the security vulnerabilities 
in the 802.11 standard. The original 802.11 standard specified only security 
provisions sufficient for wired networks; end-to-end security cannot be ensured.  
 
In this chapter, we investigate existing and proposed WLAN security technologies to 
improve the 802.11 standard. Security concerns over WLAN vulnerabilities are 
explored, and associated techniques are provided to mitigate these vulnerabilities. We 
also analyse the two types of AAA integrated network security solutions, 802.1X and  
VPNs.  
3.1 Security of the IEEE 802.11 Standard 
In this section, we examine the security mechanisms provided by the 802.11 standard. 
Vulnerabilities such as weak key derivation and management have been identified in 
the WEP protocol. Improvements in key management and authentication to fix these 
flaws are presented. 
3.1.1 802.11b Security Mechanisms  
The 802.11 standard provides two types of authentication (open system and shared 
key), and a privacy method (WEP), as shown in Table 3-1. These mechanisms mainly 
deal with the security provisions in the link and physical layers of the open systems 
interconnection (OSI) model. They do not support either end-to-end or user-
authentication. The standard only aims to make wireless networks as secure as its 
wired counterparts.  
Authentication Method Open System and Shared Key 
Privacy Method WEP (optional; to be used with Shared Key) 
 
Table 3-1 802.11 Authentication and Privacy Methods 
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3.1.1.1 Authentication 
÷ Open System Authentication  
This is the default authentication service. It is in fact ‘null’ authentication, i.e. no 
authentication at all and this method authenticates any clients who request to join a 
network. 
÷ Shared Key Authentication 
The same secret (thus global) key is shared between an AP and stations to 
authenticate stations joining a network. The key resides in each station’s management 
information base (MIB) in write-only form and is available only to the MAC layer. 
This method requires the use of the WEP mechanism. 
 
The process of the shared key authentication operates in four steps:  
 The requesting station sends an authentication frame to the AP. 
 The AP receives the authentication frame and replies with a random 
challenge text generated by the WEP encryption engine, using the 
pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). 
 The requesting station copies the challenge text in an authentication 
frame, then encrypts it with the shared secret key. The encrypted frame 
is sent back to the AP. 
 The receiving AP decrypts the text with the same shared key, and 
compares it to the challenge text sent earlier. Confirmation is sent if a 
match occurs, else a negative authentication is generated. 
3.1.1.2 Privacy 
The 802.11 standard includes the WEP as an optional protocol. WEP ensures the 
confidentiality and integrity of data transmitted between users when using shared key 
authentication. 
3.1.1.2.1 WEP Protocol 
WEP encryption uses the same 60-bit shared secret key to encrypt and decrypt data. In 
WEP, it is necessary to generate a different Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) key for each packet 
from a shared key. WEP was not designed for high security, but rather to be at least as 
secure as its wired counterpart. Two processes work inside the algorithm; one 
encrypts the plain text while the other protects the data’s integrity. The main 
components of this algorithm use an initialisation vector (IV) of 24 bits, PRNG and 
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an integrity check value (ICV) of 32 bits, as shown in Figure 3-1. The secret key is 



















Figure 3-2 WEP Decipherment Block Diagram[ANSI/IEEE. Std 802.11, 1999] 
A frame contains the encrypted data (ciphertext block) together with the ICV and the 
cleartext IV (Figures 3-1 and 3-2). Data integrity is provided by the ICV. The output 
message is generated by concatenating IV and the secret key (the key remains 
constant), while the IV changes periodically when connections between devices are 
made [Weatherspoon, 2000]. The IV can be reused after a limited time; this is one of 
the major weaknesses of WEP (see Section 3.1.2), because the standard specifies a 
very weak key derivation and management. The keys generated for different data 
packets are too similar because the IV is very limited. Furthermore, static key 
management of WEP requires manual configurations on wireless devices, thus, as the 
numbers of clients grow, administration overheads increase. 
 
Vendors have provided support for a stronger WEP key length of 128-bits in their 
WLAN solutions. However, this method is still vulnerable to attacks, as we explain in 
the next section. 
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3.1.2 WEP Safety Issues 
In many reported incidents, attacks on WLANs showed that WEP was not activated 
[Held, 2001; WECA, 2001a]. Vendors provide a deactivated WEP as a default 
installation, but a survey conducted by Gartner found that about “60 percent of Wi-Fi 
(802.11b) installations did not even turn the WEP on” [McDonough, 2002].  
 
The WEP in the 802.11 standard provides only limited support in safeguarding the 
network. The vulnerabilities in WEP’s cryptography design have led to security 
problems such as modification of data, redirection attacks, rogue APs, and replay 
attacks.  
 
Borisov et al. [2001] discovered that the WEP has fundamental flaws in the 
cryptographic design of the implementation of the RC4 encryption algorithm and 
checksum methods. In particular, this relates to key reuse and weak message 
authentication. They claimed that the WEP’s goals of securing confidentiality, access 
control, and data integrity had all failed. The classical 40-bit and extended versions of 
the 128-bit key size provided by the WEP did not deter hackers, indicating that key 
size was irrelevant. The 24-bit IV is prone to reuse frequency, because the vector size 
is limited. IV collisions produce identical WEP keys when the same IV is used with 
the same shared secret key for more than one data frame, and this is the weakness that 
attackers exploit. This claim is supported by an early study by Walker [2000], which 
showed that regardless of key size, the vulnerability in RC4 prevented the WEP from 
providing “a meaningful notion of privacy to users”. In addition, weak message 
authentication made it possible to inject traffic into the network. Although long key-
length versions of WEP were released to the market, the flaws in WEP were not 
caused by a shorter key.  
 
An experiment on the security mechanisms mentioned previously was conducted by 
Arbaugh et al. [2001]; they discovered weaknesses in the 802.11 access control 
mechanism even when it was used with the WEP authentication method. Thus they 
stated, “all of these (even vendors’ proprietary security) mechanisms are completely 
ineffective”. This weakness increases the risk of rogue AP networks and station 
redirection attacks (see Section 3.2). 
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Considering these three papers, all the security mechanisms in 802.11 are 
compromised. Until this point, attacks on the WEP were based on the design of the 
system, and users assumed the underlying cryptography, RSA3’s RC4 algorithm, was 
sound. Fluhrer et al. [2001] presented the final blow to WEP security when they found 
“weaknesses in the key scheduling algorithm” of RC4. These flaws made the RC4 
keys fundamentally weak, and the authors designed an attack that would allow a 
passive user to recover the secret WEP key simply by collecting a sufficient number 
of frames encrypted with weak keys. An implementation of the attack was carried out 
by Stubblefield et al. [2001]. Tools to plan an attack (such as AirSnort and 
WEPCrack) exist, and key recovery with AirSnort takes only a few seconds when a 
sufficient number of weakly encrypted frames are gathered.  
 
These studies showed that the WEP security mechanism is ineffective unless good 
key management is designed. The vulnerabilities in 802.11 can be generalised as 
follows: 
 No dynamically generated session keys  
 Static WEP keys 
 No mutual authentication 
3.1.3 WEP Improvements 
The link layer security provisions in the 802.11 standards are all vulnerable to attacks. 
Therefore, systems should deploy “additional higher- level security mechanisms such 
as access control, end-to-end encryption, password protection, authentication, virtual 
private networks, or firewalls” [WECA, 2001a] and assume WEP as a very basic layer 
of security only. 
 
The IEEE 802.11 committee has set up task group 802.11i [TGi, 2002] to enhance the 
security and authentication mechanism of the current 802.11 MAC. Their work has 
resulted in the development of: 
 Replacement of the 802.11 standard with 802.1X authentication and 
key management. 
                                                 
3 Rivest Shamir and Aldeman, an IT company providing security mechanism and products, see 
www.rsa.com. 
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 Improvement of the exiting WEP with temporal key integrity protocol 
(TKIP), also known as WEP2. 
 Deployment of enhanced security network (ESN) solution with a 
stronger encryption algorithm. 
3.1.3.1 Replace 802.11 Authentication & Key Management with 802.1X 
The 802.1X standard has been introduced to provide a centralised authentication and 
dynamic key distribution for 802.11 architecture utilising the 802.1X standard with 
RADIUS [Roshan, 2001; Task Group i, 2002]. 802.1X is an authentication standard 
for 802-based LANs using port-based network access control. The 802.1X standard is 
used for communication between wireless clients and APs, while RADIUS operates 
between an AP and an authentication server (see Section 3.5).  
3.1.3.2 Improve WEP with TKIP 
The TKIP solution deploys a hashing technique that generates a temporal key (a 
unique RC4 key) to derive a per data packet key. This strengthens the RC4 key-
scheduling algorithm by pre-processing the key and the IV by passing them through 
hashing. 
 
The solution consists of: 
 An encryptor and decryptor that share a RC4 104-bit or 128-bit secret 
key. This key is called the temporal key (TK). 
 An encryptor and decryptor that use the RC4 stream cipher. 
 An IV value that is not used more than once with each TK. 
Implementations must ensure that the TK is updated before the full 16-
bit IV [Housley & Whiting, 2001] or 48-bit IV [Housley et al., 2002] 
space is exhausted. The 48-bit IV solution provides a longer key life 
span than 16-bit IV. 
 
The solution specifies a two-phase processing of the TK to determine the per-packet 
encryption key. Phase one involves key mixing where the transmitter address (TA) is 
mixed into the TK to ensure that the various parties encrypting with the TK use 
different key streams. By mixing the TA and the TK, a different set of keys is used by 
each party. Traffic sent by a STA to the AP will use a different set of keys than traffic 
sent by the AP to the STA. This output is likely to be cached to improve performance 
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and can be reused to process subsequent packets associated with the same TK and TA. 
Phase two mixes the output of the first phase with the IV and generates a unique per-
packet key for each data packet. To avoid any repetition of keys, the IV must be 
different for each packet encrypted under the TK. 
3.1.3.3 Deploy ESN Solution 
The ESN solution is focused on stronger encryption for data over wireless networks 
by using a non-proprietary 128-bit encryption solution, which will support the 
advanced encryption standard (AES) encryption algorithm. Also, HMAC4-SHA1-128 
can be used as the hashing function to support message authentication with AES [TGi, 
2002]. 
3.2 Wireless Security Threats and Risks 
Wired and wireless LANs share some common security risks: physical security, 
insider attacks, unauthorised access and eavesdropping. A study published by the Wi-
Fi Alliance in October 2001 found that “security has been, and remains, the overriding 
concern regarding wireless networking deployment” [WECA, 2001b], among 72% of 
wireless intenders and 50% of wireless adopters.  
3.2.1 Types of Security Threats  
A taxonomy of security threats is depicted in Figure 3-3. These attacks can come from 












Figure 3-3 Taxonomy of Security Threats [Karygiannis & Owens, 2002] 
                                                 
4 Hashed message authentication code (HMAC) with either message digest algorithm (MD5) or secure 
hashing algorithm (SHA1). 
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3.2.1.1 Passive Attacks 
An unauthorised party gains access to a network and does not modify the resources on 
the network. Types of passive attack include: 
 Eavesdropping: An attacker simply monitors and listens to message 
content transmissions. For example, an unauthorised person drives 
through the city and listens to various WLAN transmissions within 
different organisations (i.e. war driving, see Section 3.2.3 for more 
details). 
 Traffic Analysis: An attacker monitors the traffic for communication 
pattern analysis. The statistics collected can be used to perform a 
dictionary attack.  
3.2.1.2 Active Attacks 
An unauthorised party gains access to a network and modifies the resources on the 
network. An attacker must first spoof either the MAC address and/or IP address of a 
user/device to gain network access, and then change the content of the network 
resources. Types of attack include: 
 Masquerading: An attacker impersonates an authorised user and 
thereby gains certain unauthorised privileges. Masquerading includes 
the use of spoofing, rogue APs, and redirection attacks. An attacker can 
fool users to log in to the rogue AP by placing a rogue AP in the same 
area as a valid AP, sending the same SSID but with a stronger signal 
than the valid AP. The attacker is able to decipher the shared key from 
the traffic collected. The rogue AP can be used to redirect users’ 
transmissions to an invalid destination, or to insert deauthentication 
packets. 
 Replay: An attacker monitors the traffic (passive attack) then 
retransmits the message as the legitimate user.  
 Message Modification: An attacker alters the legitimate message by 
deleting, adding, changing, or recording it. Furthermore, an attacker may 
wish to alter the configuration of a device, using, for example, simple 
network management protocol (SNMP) to configure APs. 
 Denial-of-service (DoS): An attacker prevents or renders the normal 
use or management of network systems useless by issuing malicious 
commands or injecting a large amount of traffic that fills up the radio 
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frequency. This type of attack can be further extended to distributed 
DoS (DDoS) attacks. 
3.2.2 Physical Security of Wireless Devices 
Physical security is the most fundamental step in ensuring that only authorised users 
have access to wireless devices such as laptops, handhelds, and APs. APs (or base 
stations) must be difficult to access to prevent security breaches, and the AP must be 
placed for an adequate coverage area. For example, the improper placement of an AP 
might allow an attacker to bypass other security measures, such as modifying the AP 
configuration by direct connection. Physical locks, cipher locks, and biometric 
systems can be used to counter thefts. 
3.2.3 WLAN Attacks 
Wireless networks without proper security implementation can be penetrated easily. 
The physical freedom of a WLAN is also its vulnerability; traffic is no longer 
confined to a wire. Privacy concerns over data transmission increase because data on 
a WLAN is “broadcast for all to hear” [O'Hara & Petrick, 1999]; eavesdropping 
becomes easy. In addition, RF-based networks are open to packet interception by any 
receiver within range of a data transmitter. 802.11 beacon frames, used to broadcast 
network parameters, are sent unencrypted. Thus by monitoring beacon frames, 
wandering users with an 802.11 receiver can discover wireless networks in the area. 
 
In addition, the deployment of wireless networks opens a “back door” [Arbaugh et al., 
2001] into the internal network that permits an attacker access beyond the physical 
security perimeter of the organisation. The lack of a physical boundary allows attacks 
such as sniffing, resource stealing, traffic redirection, DoS, SSID, and MAC address 
masquerading to occur. 
 
War driving is similar to war dialling (dialling every number looking for a modem 
backdoor into a network), and the Wall Street Journal reported an incident in which 
two people armed with wireless tools were able to drive around Silicon Valley and 
intercept traffic such as emails over unprotected WLANs [Bansal, 2001]. Another 
example was an audit carried out of four major airports in the US [Brewin & Verton, 
2002]. This study found that WLANs in applications such as passenger check-in and 
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baggage transfers were operating without even some of the most basic forms of 
security protection. Using NetStumbler, an AP-detection tool, the authors discovered 
that only 32 of the 112 WLAN APs had the WEP protocol turned on, and most of the 
APs were broadcasting plaintext SSIDs. Furthe rmore, the authors detected several 
WLAN APs operating at Chicago’s International Airport with broadcast SSIDs of “X-
ray” and unencrypted files were transmitted. 
 
Other new types of attacks include warspammers and warchalking. Warspamming 
takes advantage of unprotected WLANs to bombard email users with unsolicited and 
unwelcome messages. Warchalking takes place when hackers draw a chalk symbol on 
a wall or piece of pavement to indicate the presence of a wireless networking node. 
Warchalking was originally developed to alert system administrators to their wireless 
network security lapses [Wearden, 2002]. 
3.3 Risk Mitigation and Countermeasures 
WLAN risks can be mitigated by applying both basic and AAA infrastructure 
countermeasures to address specific attacks and threats. Basic countermeasures 
involve altering the existing security functions provided within wireless equipment. 
These countermeasures provide only limited defence against casual attacks; for 
determined adversaries, organisations should consider AAA integrated solutions. The 
AAA infrastructure countermeasures provide integrated solutions using existing AAA 
infrastructure components such as the RADIUS protocol (see Section 3.4) and public 
key infrastructure (PKI, see Section 3.7), with network solutions such as VPN and the 
802.1X standards. 
3.3.1 Basic Countermeasures  
Every wireless device comes with different default settings; such built- in 
configurations can be prone to security vulnerabilities. This section discusses basic 
security protection to prevent casual attacks. 
3.3.1.1 Change Default Password 
Default passwords such as “public” or blank passwords are not sufficient protection. 
Administrators should deploy strong passwords of at least 8 characters that are 
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consistent with the organisation’s security policies. When combining this with AAA 
infrastructure solutions, two-factor authentication can be implemented. 
3.3.1.2 Change SSID  
The factory default SSID for an AP may provide network names like “Tsunami”, 
which can easily be detected. The SSID should not provide information on the 
function or location of an AP such as X-ray. Naming convention of SSIDs should be 
formed according to an organisation’s policy, an example is shown in Figure 3-4 














Figure 3-4 An Example of Naming Conventions for Wireless Devices 
3.3.1.3 Enable MAC Authentication 
A MAC address is a hardware address that uniquely identifies each device on a 
network (e.g. a wireless network adapter). They identify devices, not users. Vendors5 
provide MAC-address filtering capability to regulate communication among different 
computers on a network. During the initial connection procedures, wireless APs can 
check the MAC address of connecting stations to ensure the station is on the list of 
known good MAC addresses, called a MAC access control list (ACL). However, a 
MAC ACL does not provide strong authentication against determined attacks. MAC 
addresses are transmitted in cleartext from a wireless network interface card (NIC) to 
an AP; eavesdropping software can easily capture MAC addresses. Furthermore, users 
                                                 
5 For larger organisations with multiple APs, consider storing the MAC list at a centralised location 
using a RADIUS server. 
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with sufficient operating system privileges can alter addresses to masquerade as an 
allowed wireless-network user. 
 
Address filtering relies on information technology (IT) departments issuing wireless 
LAN cards to users and maintaining an organisation-wide list of MAC addresses 
allowed to connect to a wireless network. This might be impractical in medium-to-
large organisations because it increases the administrative burden. 
3.3.1.4 Protect the AP Placement 
Improper placement of APs (Section 3.2.2) can lead to security breaches. If malicious 
users can gain physical access to an AP, they would be able to change the 
configuration of the AP. Organisations need physical security on their wireless 
devices. Regular security audits ensure risk mitigation. 
3.3.1.5 Enable WEP Authentication 
Built- in security configurations do not enable the WEP security function by default. 
To provide at least some basic defence against attacks, shared authentication should 
be used instead of open system authentication. 
3.3.1.6 WEP Encryption 
Deploy the strongest encryption method available whenever possible. The shared 
secret key value provided as the default setting must be changed to prevent security 
breaches. Note that enabling the WEP mechanism can only prevent basic attacks 
(Section 3.2.3), and for determined adversaries, the WEP key length is unsafe at any 
size (Section 3.1.2). 
3.3.1.7 Change SNMP Parameters  
SNMP agents can be configured in APs to allow network management software tools 
to monitor the status of an AP and its clients. The default SNMP community string 
commonly used by SNMP agents is the word “public” with assigned “read” or “read 
and write” privileges. To prevent unauthorised users from writing data to an AP (an 
integrity breach), SNMP parameter settings must be changed or disabled (if SNMP is 
not required in the organisation). 
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Several vendors use SNMP as an AP management mechanism and thereby increase 
vulnerabilities. For example, one vendor uses SNMPv1 for AP management, thus all 
management traffic traverses the network unencrypted. Another vendor allows SNMP 
read access to WEP keys, even though WEP keys must remain secret. Most vendors 
use cleartext telnet for remote command-line interfaces. Web-based interfaces are 
nearly all simple HTTP and do not use secure socket layer (SSL) or transport layer 
security (TLS) for protection.  
 
Improvements for network resource management may consider using SNMPv3 or 
policy based network management (PBNM, [Wong, 2001]) with common open policy 
service (COPS) protocol for better security. 
3.3.1.8 Change the Default Channel 
To prevent DoS attacks and radio interferences between two or more APs in close 
location, the channel setting of an AP must be changed to operate in a different 
frequency band. 
3.3.1.9 DHCP Usage 
Automatic network connections involve the use of a dynamic host control protocol 
(DHCP) server. The DHCP automatically assigns IP addresses to clients that associate 
with an AP. Using DHCP allows users the advantages of roaming or establishing ad 
hoc networks. However, the threat with DHCP is that a malicious user can easily gain 
unauthorised access using a mobile device, because DHCP may not know which 
wireless access devices have access permission, and might automatically assign the 
device a valid IP address. Depending on the size of the network, disabling DHCP and 
using static IP addresses may be feasible. 
 
A solution to overcome DHCP threats might involve placing the DHCP behind the 
wired network’s firewall, which grants access to a wireless network located outside 
the firewall. If user authentication and access control are moved to the link layer, then 
threats to the DHCP are limited to insider attacks. An AAA integrated solution such 
as 802.1X authentication can mitigate DHCP risk. 
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3.3.2 AAA Infrastructure Solutions  
AAA infrastructure provides centralised network management. Several AAA 
protocols exist, such as RADIUS (see Section 3.4 for more detail). Existing network 
solutions such as VPNs incorporate AAA infrastructure; and it is essential to provide 
remote access control for dial- in users. Enhancing WLAN security requires 
integration with an AAA infrastructure to overcome security vulnerabilities. Two 
security solutions have been recommended in various studies [Borisov et al., 2001; 
Caballero & Malmkvist, 2002; Convery & Miller, 2001; Karygiannis & Owens, 2002; 
TGi, 2002]: 
 802.1X Solution 
 VPN Solution 
3.3.2.1 802.1X Solution 
This solution utilises the existing 802.1X standard, incorporating the port-based 
network access control for 802.11 infrastructures, and leveraging AAA protocols to 
support wireless LAN security. Authentication methods are based on an extensible 
authentication protocol (EAP) to provide integration capability (with future 
authentication methods6, see Section 3.5).  
3.3.2.2 VPN Solution 
This solution applies the existing wired network solution to the wireless counterparts, 
using security mechanisms such as IP Security (IPSec) and tunnelling (see Section 
3.6). 
3.3.3 Additional Enhancements 
Additional enhancements can be applied regardless of whether or not an integrated 
network security solution exists in the organisation. 
3.3.3.1 Firewalls 
Placing a firewall between the trusted wired network and untrusted wireless networks 
provides an extra layer of access control [Harris, 1998]. Interoperability between 
                                                 
6 This group includes secure remote password  (SRP) and tunnelled transport layer security (TTLS) 
authentication methods, but they have not been widely adopted yet, but may become future mainstream 
authentication choices. 
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vendors’ products must be considered when a firewall facilitates the traffic flow 
between wired and wireless networks. 
 
Implementing personal firewall software on client computers can provide some 
protection against attacks, especially for clients accessing public WLANs. 
Organisations can set up these personal firewalls to be centrally or user managed.  
3.3.3.2 IDS 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) provides effective security against unauthorised 
attempts to alter network resources, whether the network has been compromised or 
accessed. It minimises the risk of an intruder breaking into authentication servers and 
compromising databases. Some IDS systems are specially designed for the WLAN 
environment, such as AirDefense IDS. 
3.3.3.3 Anti-Virus Software  
In common with wired networks, anti-virus systems provide another level of security 
against attacks, such as virus, worms and Trojans. Organisations should deploy anti-
virus software on both authentication servers and wireless clients to ensure system 
integrity. 
3.3.3.4 Software Upgrades and Patches 
Regular updates on software patches and upgrades, such as AP management software, 
will assist in ensuring that as many security vulnerabilities have been identified and 
corrected as possible. 
3.3.3.5 Application Layer Security 
Additional access control can by provided using applications with strong built- in 
cryptographic systems. In particular web-based systems can be secured with the SSL 
or TLS and host logins can be secured with secure shell (SSH7). Other environments 
may have already deployed a framework such as Kerberos for application layer 
security, which may be able to be configured for wireless networks (e.g. Windows 
2000-based networks). 
                                                 
7 Also known as secure socket shell. 
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3.4 AAA Infrastructure 
AAA [Mitton et al., 2001] is important in both wired and wireless networks to ensure 
network security as well as providing a mechanism for billing. AAA protocols 
currently include RADIUS, terminal access controller access control system 
(TACACS, [Finseth, 1993]), and DIAMETER. RADIUS and TACACS were 
developed for remote user dial- in services and were not specifically designed to 
support wireless access networks. TACACS is a Cisco proprietary products and an 
improved version is called TACACS+.  
 
DIAMETER [Calhoun et al., 2002] in contrast, takes wireless network access into 
consideration and supports applications such as IP mobility and roaming. RADIUS is 
the most widely deployed protocol for services such as dialup point-to-point protocol 
(PPP) and terminal server access. Infrastructure networks often deploy AAA 
architecture to ensure network access control (examples include VPN solutions). In 
this thesis, RADIUS is the AAA protocol used to deploy WLAN security solutions. 
Furthermore, this study concentrated on the interaction between authentication and 
encryption, accounting methods and usage were outside our scope. 
3.4.1 RADIUS 
RADIUS is defined in RFC 2865 [Rigney, Willats, Rubens et al., 2000] and RFC 
2869 [Rigney, Willats, & Calhoun, 2000], and is used in a client/server environment 
(Figure 3-5), and has been widely used by businesses and Internet service providers 
(ISPs) to control remote access.  
 
NAS







Figure 3-5 RADIUS Communication Exchange  
A RADIUS client is a type of network access server (NAS), and sends authentication 
and accounting requests to the RADIUS server in order to gain network access. 
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RADIUS servers are responsible for authenticating users’ requests from a NAS and 
grant or reject access based on user credentials. RADIUS accounting is used to collect 
accounting data on users for billing, auditing, or trend analysis purposes. Interactions 
between the client and RADIUS server are authenticated through a shared secret that 
is never transmitted over the network. UDP (rather than TCP) is used as the transport 
protocol for RADIUS (port 1812 for authentication and port 1813 for accounting). 
RADIUS supports a variety of authentication methods, including EAP. AAA servers 
based on the RADIUS protocol include Microsoft’s Internet Authentication Server 
(IAS), Cisco’s Access Control Server (ACS), and FreeRADIUS. Microsoft IAS was 
the RADIUS server used in this study. Caballero and Malmkvist [2002] investigated 
and designed a NAS using the RADIUS protocol for public WLAN access networks, 
while Lee [2002] evaluated different interactions of AAA architecture with mobile IP 
for WLANs. 
3.4.1.2 Authentication Protocols 
An AAA server can support different types of user authentication methods: 
 Password authentication protocol (PAP) uses cleartext passwords. It 
provides low security protection against unauthorised access. 
 Challenge handshake authentication protocol (CHAP) is a challenge-
response authentication protocol using an industry-standard message 
hashing5  (MD5) one-way encryption scheme to encrypt the response8. 
 Microsoft-CHAP (MS-CHAP) is a proprietary protocol that supports 
one-way, encrypted password authentication. If the AAA server 
supports MS-CHAP, data encryption can be carried out using Microsoft 
point-to-point encryption (MPPE), which is based on the RC4 algorithm. 
MS-CHAP2 is an improved version and offers mutual authentication. 
 Shiva Password Authentication Protocol (SPAP) is a two-way 
reversible encryption mechanism employed by Shiva. 
 EAP protocol defined in RFC 2284 [Blunk & Vollbrecht, 1998], is a 
general protocol for PPP authentication that supports multiple 
authentication mechanisms. EAP does not select a specific 
authentication mechanism at the link control phase, but rather postpones 
                                                 
8 In a Microsoft environment, users’ passwords need to be stored in reversible encrypted format. 
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this until the authentication phase. The client and AAA server negotiate 
the exact authentication method to be used (see Section 3.5.2 for more 
detail). EAP supports the following authentication types: 
ü MD5-CHAP encrypts user names and passwords with an 
MD5 algorithm. This is equivalent to CHAP. 
ü TLS uses digital certificates or smartcard devices. 
Authentication requires a user certificate and private key. 
ü Additional support for third-party authentication such as 
tunnelled TLS (TTLS) from Funk. 
3.5 IEEE 802.1X Standard 
The 802.11 working group has adopted the IEEE 802.1X standard, providing port 
based network access control, a mechanism that uses the physical access 
characteristics of the IEEE 802.LAN infrastructure. The 802.11 TGi has taken the 
IEEE Std. 802.1X [2001] as its base to control network access on point-to-point 
connections, and adds several features for 802.11 LANs (WLANs). These features 
include dynamic key management and user-based authentication (whereas WEP only 
provides device-based authentication).  
 
Leveraging open standards such as EAP [Blunk & Vollbrecht, 1998], and RADIUS, 
the 802.1X standard (Figure 3-6, adapted from Orinoco [2002]) enables interoperable 
user identification and centralised management. Mutual authentication (e.g. TLS) can 
be carried out to ensure that the derived keys arrive at the right entity, avoiding 
attacks from rogue APs. Two communication protocols are used to facilitate the 
802.1X exchange. Together they form the underlying EAP framework (see Section 
3.5.1 for more details): 
 EAP over LAN (EAPOL) is used between the authenticator’s port 
access entity (PAE) and supplicant’s PAE,  
 EAP over Wireless (EAPOW) is another EAPOL packet type defined 
for use in transporting global keys (EAPOW-keys), 
 EAP over RADIUS (de-facto), the authenticator PAE communicates 
with the authentication server (AS) using the EAP protocol carried in a 


















Figure 3-6 802.1X over 802.11 Topology 
Key management provides the ability for an AP to distribute or obtain global9 key 
information to/from attached stations, through the use of the EAPOL-key messages, 
after successful authentication. EAPOL defines the encapsulation techniques used in 
order to carry EAP packets between the client and an AP. Note that 802.1X 
authentication occurs after 802.11 associations (see Section 2.2.5). Keys are derived 
on the client and the AAA server (in this case the RADIUS server).  
 
If negotiation of a session key during authentication is required, the use of EAP-TLS 
protocol is recommended. Thus, 802.1X can derive keys that provide per session key 
authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. However, it does not provide these per 
se, but only assists in deriving keys for the session; cryptographic support from WEP, 
triple data encryption standard (3DES), or AES is required to provide encryption. 
802.1X requires an authentication protocol and EAP-TLS (RFC 2246, [Dierks & 
Allen, 1999]) is commonly used to support the key derivation algorithm. 
3.5.1 802.1X Architecture  
The standard defines the following components, shown in Figure 3-7 (adapted from 
IEEE 802.1X standard). The architecture can be used with any 802 networks, such as 
802.3 and 802.11. At the top of the diagram, we illustrate the physical components 
above the logical model that may be used for a WLAN environment.  
                                                 











Figure 3-7 802.1X Architecture 
÷ Port 
This is a single point of attachment to the LAN infrastructure. It may be a physical 
network interface or a virtual MAC such as the logical ports managed by an AP in an 
802.11 LAN. 
÷ PAE 
The protocol entity associated with a port. It can support the protocol functionality 
associated with either the authenticator, the supplicant, or both. 
÷ Supplicant 
A component at one end of a point-to-point LAN segment and is authenticated by an 
authenticator attached to the other end of that link. Supplicants are also called client 
stations in our research. 
÷ Authenticator 
The authenticator is at the other end of the LAN segment and facilitates authentication 
of the component attached to the other end of that link. It is important to note that the 
authenticator’s functionality is independent of the actual authentication method. It 
simply acts as a pass-through for the authentication server. 
÷ AS 
This is a component that provides an authentication service to an authenticator. It 
determines whether a supplicant is authorised to access the services by the 
authenticator based on the supplicant’s credentials. 
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It is possible to authenticate using just the AP only, although in practice all 
authentication should be carried out by the AS. It is more desirable to implement an 
AAA server (in this case a RADIUS serve r) to centrally manage access control. In 
such situations, the authenticator is expected to act as an AAA client. 
3.5.2 EAP 
An EAP authentication protocol allows greater flexibility and scalability for future 
authentication support without the need to change the AP or the NIC.  Authentication 
and key exchange can be upgraded without hardware modifications, avoiding 
limitations commonly associated with the WEP. 
 
Authentication processes can be performed using a username/password combination 
or digital certificate. A certificate is similar to a passport, and is issued by a trusted 
authority (see Section 3.7 PKI) to provide a strong one-to-one relationship. 
Furthermore, EAP authentication methods can support encryption key generation to 
protect the information transferred between the supplicant and the AS. Major types of 
EAP include: 
 EAP-MD5 is equivalent to CHAP [Simpson, 1996]. The client is 
authenticated by the AS using the password supplied by the client. No 
mutual authentication can be performed, as the client cannot 
authenticate the AS. There are no encryption keys generated during the 
authentication process. 
 EAP-TLS [Aboba & Simon, 1999] provides mutual authentication of 
the client and the AS, and is carried out using digital certificates. The 
AS requires access to the certificate repository, and encryption keys are 
generated during the exchange. Certificates may be replaced by 
smartcards; Windows 2000 platform supports such an authentication 
process [Aboba & Simon, 1999]. 
 EAP-Tunnelled TLS (TTLS) is a Funk proprietary [Funk & Blake-
Wilson, 2002; Orinoco, 2002] authentication mechanism. It combines 
EAP-TLS and traditional password-based methods [Orinoco, 2002] such 
as CHAP, and one time passwords (OTP). The client does not need a 
digital certificate, but can be authenticated using a password. The client 
authenticates the server via an X.509 certificate, while the server 
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authenticates the client by its encrypted password. Encryption keys are 
generated during the exchange. 
 EAP-SRP assumes that both the client and the AS are authenticated 
using a password supplied by the client [Orinoco, 2002; Wu, 2000]. 
Clients are not required to store or manage any long-term keys, which 
eliminate the reusable password problem. Encryption keys are generated 
during the exchange. 
 
 EAP-TLS and EAP-MD5 protocols are the common authentication methods 
associated with 802.1X deployments. This thesis is limited to analysis of both of these 
methods. 
3.5.3 802.1X over 802.11 
Applying the 802.1X structure to the 802.11 network architecture (Figure 3-8) 
provides a controlled wireless network with user identification, centralised 
authentication, and key management. Dynamic key management in an 802.1X 
framework rectifies the drawbacks in the WEP security mechanism by deploying per-
user session keys.  
 
802.1X authentication is carried out after an 802.11 association. Prior to 
authentication, the AP filters all non-802.1X traffic to and from the client. Only after 
the AS has successfully authenticated the client, can it be allowed to access the 
network. The IETF Network Working Group has presented a draft on 802.1X 
RADIUS usage [Congdon et al., 2002], supporting a RADIUS server as the backend 
AS. Keys derived between the client and the RADIUS server are transferred from the 
RADIUS server to the AP after successful authentication. The secret shared between 
the RADIUS server and its client will be used to encrypt the attribute containing the 
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Figure 3-8 802.1X/RADIUS over an 802.11 Network  
One session key can be derived for each user per session. However, if global keys 
(multicast/WEP keys) are used, then the session key (unicast key) sent from the AS to 
the AP is only used to encrypt the global key, providing per-packet authentication and 
integrity. An EAPOW-key packet is used for the global keys. 
 
The 802.1X standard also supports per-station session keys, but most practical 
implementations only support global keys. This is because if global keys are 
supported, the session key is only used to encrypt the global key. The problem 
associated with global keys (that secrets shared among many people can lead to 
compromise of the secret), is solved by deploying the 802.1X per-session user keys. 
 
Windows XP [Microsoft, 2002d] is an example of a supplicant that has integrated 
support for the 802.1X protocol. Its authentication types support EAP-MD5 and EAP-
TLS. This platform was used in this study. 
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3.5.4.1 EAP-MD5  
The EAP-MD5 authentication method provides one-way password-based 
authentication of the client performed by the AS. It is popular due to its easy 
deployment of passwords and usernames. However, it provides limited security, and 
no encryption keys are generated during the exchange. EAP-MD5 can be useful in 
public areas if encryption is provided at the application layer. The process is 

























Figure 3-9 EAP-MD5 Authentication Process 
3.5.4.2 EAP-TLS 
EAP-TLS is the most commonly implemented EAP type for WLANs. Its 
authentication is based on PKI support using X.509 certificates. Both the AS and 
clients must possess certificates validated by a trusted authority, which ensures 
explicit mutual authentication. After the authentication exchange, a shared session key 
is generated between the AS and the client. After the AS supplies the secret key to the 
AP via a secured link (using EAP over RADIUS), the AS and the client can use it to 
bootstrap their per-packet authenticated and secured communication. Deploying EAP-
TLS is complicated; thus, depending on the scale of an organisation’s network, 
administrative burdens might outweigh the security advantages. Figure 3-10 (adapted 










































Figure 3-10 EAP-TLS Authentication Process 
3.6 VPN  
Virtual private network  (VPN) technology is a rapidly growing security solution 
which provides secure data transmission over shared or public networks such as the 
Internet. Data is transmitted over the network by creating an encrypted, virtual, point-
to-point connection between the client and a gateway VPN server that resides in a 
private network (Figure 3-11). VPNs provide organisations with a range of security 
tools to protect their internal infrastructures from external compromises [Hansen, 
2001; King, 2000; Maier, 2000]. Electronic-commerce (e-commerce) deployment 


















Figure 3-11 Typical VPN Implementation 
VPNs can be implemented on wireless LANs in a similar manner. Several options are 
associated with WLAN placement: 
 Placing the WLAN outside an organisation’s firewall and employing a 
VPN to “obviate” the need for link- layer security and provide extra 
access control. This method might be derived from the same method 
used for Internet access [Maier, 2000] - treating wireless deployment as 
an extranet access. This approach may be expensive depending on an 
organisation’s needs.  
 Other literature [Convery & Miller, 2001; InterLink Networks, 2001; 
Seng, 2002] suggests enhancing the VPN with the Internet protocol 
security (IPSec) protocol by overlaying it on clear text 802.11 wireless 
traffic.  
 Alternatively, an organisation can set up a wireless demilitarised zone 
(WDMZ) [Enterasys Network, 2002] inside the organisation’s network 
to filter out unauthorised access. This alternative ensures end-to-end 
security and prevents threats such as replay and traffic analysis attacks. 
 
Rincón [2002] provided a secured WLAN for home and small-to-medium enterprise 
(SME) users with IPSec-based VPN. As a result of this, he proposed a prototype to 
automate an IPSec configuration and provide nomadic mobility for users roaming 
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between multiple WLANs. All the WLAN clients are secured from a single 
workstation acting as a gateway. Caballero and Malmkvist [2002] also suggested 
using IPSec combined with application level access control for public WLANs. 
 
The first two points are illustrated in the VPN structure shown in Figure 3-11 and 
were used in our experiment design. 
3.6.1 VPN Techniques 
VPNs employ a variety of security mechanisms, including cryptographic techniques 
and device- or user- based authentication. Tunnelling offers encapsulation (of one 
protocol packet inside another) for encrypted VPN traffic, so that third parties cannot 
view the contents of packets transported over the network.  
 
From a technology perspective, two categories of VPN can be identified based upon 
whether they operate across a Laye r 2 or Layer 3 network in the OSI Model. The 
common implementations of these two layers include the point-to-point tunnelling 
protocol (PPTP) and layer 2 tunnelling protocol (L2TP) at Layer 2 and the IPSec at 
Layer 3 [Halpern et al., 2001]. Depending on the scale of an organisation’s network, 
and how much it values its data, both VPN security technologies can be applied. Most 
VPNs today make use of the IPSec protocol suite, as it ensures stronger protection 








Figure 3-12 WLAN VPN Structure 
3.6.2 Layer 2 VPN Technologies 
As indicated above, there are two types of Layer 2 VPN technology: PPTP and L2TP. 
3.6.2.1 PPTP 
PPTP (RFC 2637, [Davies, 2001; Hamzeh et al., 1999]) uses a username and 
password to provide authenticated and encrypted communications between a client 
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and a gateway or between two gateways, without PKI support. The PPTP uses a TCP 
connection for tunnel maintenance and generic routing encapsulation (GRE) 
encapsulated PPP frames for tunnelled data. The payloads of the encapsulated PPP 
frames can be encrypted and/or compressed using Microsoft’s proprietary encryption 
mechanism, MPPE based on RC4.  
 
Authentication methods include CHAP, PAP, and MS-CHAPv2. The use of PPP 
provides the ability to negotiate authentication, encryption, IP address assignment, 
and a variety of other operational characteristics for various protocols.  
3.6.2.2 L2TP 
L2TP (RFC 2661, [Townsley et al., 1999]) encapsulates PPP frames to be sent over a 
wide range of communication types, such as IP, frame relay, or ATM networks. When 
configured to use IP as its transport, L2TP can be used as a VPN tunnelling protocol 
over the Internet. It uses UDP to send L2TP control messages for tunnel maintenance 
and L2TP-encapsulated PPP frames as the tunnelled data on UDP port 1701. The 
encapsulated PPP frames can be encrypted or compressed.  
 
Through its use of PPP, L2TP gains multi-protocol support and provides a wide range 
of user authentication options, including CHAP, MS-CHAP, MS-CHAPv2 and EAP.  
3.6.3 Layer 3 VPN - IPSec  
IPSec, defined in RFC 2401 and 2411 [Kent & Atkinson, 1998; Rodgers, 2001; 
Thayer et al., 1998], provides integrity protection, authentication, and (optional) 
privacy and replay protection services for IP traffic. IPSec is currently the most 
popular protocol due to perceived security and its ability to use a single technology 
for both remote and Intranet/Extranet applications. IPSec sets up security associations 
(SAs), to negotiate security services between two points during the session. These 
SAs can be nested, allowing different IPSec relationships to be active on the same 
link, such as quick mode and main mode10. In order to establish an SA, IPSec relies on 
the Internet security association and key management protocol (ISAKMP, RFC 2408 
[Maughan et al., 1998]) and internet key exchange (IKE, RFC 2409 [Harkins & 
Carrel, 1998; Maughan et al., 1998] ), which defines protocol formats and procedures 
                                                 
10 Microsoft Windows XP provides IPSec monitor to view these SAs. 
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for security negotiations, such as authentication type, encryption method, key lifetime 
etc. 
 
The IPSec protocol suite specifies cryptographic support of data encryption standard 
(DES) and triple DES (3DES). Hashing functions can be selected from hashing 
functions of either HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA1; HMAC-SHA1 is computationally 
more expensive than HMAC-MD5.  
  
IPSec support two main architectures (and corresponding packet types): 
 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) header, which provides privacy, 
authenticity, and integrity. 
 Authentication Header (AH), which provides only integrity and 
authenticity for packets, but not privacy. 
 
Two operational modes are provided in IPSec (see Figure 3-13): 
 Transport mode secures an existing IP packet from source to 
destination. The mode allows end-to-end points to communicate over a 
secured tunnel, and  
 Tunnel mode puts an existing IP packet inside a new IP packet that is 
sent to a tunnel end point in the IPSec format, typically between a pair 







IPSec - AH Tunnel (R/FW-R/FW)
IPSec - ESP Transport (client-server)









Figure 3-13 IPSec Tunnel Modes in Operation  
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Both transport and tunnel modes can be encapsulated in ESP or AH headers. IPSec 
transport mode was designed to provide end-to-end security for IP traffic between two 
communicating systems (for example, to secure a TCP connection or a UDP 
datagram). IPSec tunnel mode was designed primarily for network edge nodes, such 
as routers, or gateways, to secure other IP traffic inside an IPSec tunnel that connects 
one private IP network to another private IP network over a public or untrusted IP 
network. In both cases, the IKE negotiates secret keys and secured communication 
parameters to be used between two parties.  
3.6.3.1 Device Authentications  
This is also known as the machine- level authentication, which authenticates the 
device, not the user. The authentication methods include preshared secret key, and 
PKI certificates for mutual authentication. Kerberos may be used if the software 
provides the functionality, e.g. Microsoft Windows 2000-based networks.  
 
The preshared secret key method does not scale well as the size of a network grows. 
PKI provides scalability but can be complicated to deploy. This study selected PKI as 
the device authentication method to carry out WLAN experiments, because PKI was 
also deployed for user authentication with EAP-TLS. 
3.6.3.2 L2TP/IPSec provision 
L2TP/IPSec provision with L2TP tunnels, RFC 3193 [Patel et al., 2001], uses the 
IPSec protocol suite to protect L2TP traffic over IP networks. By placing L2TP (see 
Section 3.6.2.2) as the payload within an IPSec packet, communications benefit from 
the standards-based encryption and authenticity of IPSec, as well as the 
interoperability to accomplish user authentication, tunnel address assignment, multi-
protocol support, and multicast support using PPP. The combination, L2TP/IPSec, 
offers an IPSec solution to interoperable client-to-gateway VPN scenarios. 
 
Due to incompatibilities between the IKE protocol and network address translation 
(NAT), it is currently not possible to support L2TP/IPsec or IPSec transport mode 
through a NAT device. Thus the deployment of IPSec transport mode should consider 
the requirements for NAT and scalability of access control (PKI is desirable in large 
scale networks). 
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3.6.4 Protocol Comparison  















Can authenticate the user that is 
initiating the communications. 





Authenticates the machines involved 
in the communications. 
Yes* Yes Yes Yes 
NAT Capable Can pass through Network Address 
Translators to hide one or both end-
points of the communications. 
Yes Yes No No 
Multi-protocol 
Support 
Defines a standard method for 
carrying IP and non-IP traffic. 





Defines a standard way to negotiate 
an IP address for the tunnelled part 
of the communications.  Important so 
that returned packets are routed 
back through the same session rather 
than through a non-tunnelled and 
unsecured path and to eliminate 
static, manual end-system 
configuration. 
Yes Yes Yes WIP 
Encryption Can encrypt traffic it carries. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Uses PKI Can use PKI to implement encryption 
and/or authentication. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Packet 
Authenticity 
Provides an authenticity method to 
ensure packet content is not changed 
in transit. 
No No Yes Yes 
Multicast 
support 
Can carry IP multicast traffic in 
addition to IP unicast traffic. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* When used as a client VPN connection, machine-based authentication authenticates the user, not the computer. 
When used as a gateway-to-gateway connection, the computer is assigned a user ID and is authenticated. 
Table 3-2 Network Security Protocol Differences [Microsoft, 1999a] 
3.7 PKI 
Public key cryptography is an important technology for e-commerce, mobile-
commerce (m-commerce), intranets, extranets, and web-based applications, as shown 
in Figure 3-14. A PKI comprises a system of certificates, certificate authorities, 
subjects, relying partners, registration authorities, and key repositories that provide 
secure and private data exchange over an unsecured network [Hunt, 2001]. The 
standards that define the PKI framework include X.509, PKI for X.509 (PKIX), and 
the public key cryptography standards (PKCS). The X.509 standard defines data 
formats and procedures for distributing digital certificates. PKIX has been developed 
by IETF to support X.509-based PKI, and PKCS are a set of ongoing inter-vendor 
open standards produced by RSA. 
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Security is enforced by the use of public key cryptography, which ensures 
authentication, encryption, data integrity, and non-repudiation. By integrating 
WLANs with PKI, security is enhanced because organisations and users can be 
identified by digital certificates. A digital certificate acts as an electronic 
identification to establish the credentials of a communicating party. 
 
Figure 3-14 PKI Security Architecture [Hunt, 2001] 
PKI provides a high level of security for users, and is the most scalable method for 
deploying secure shared key distribution over an untrusted network. Smartcards 
provide an extra level of security to PKI, as the certificates are integrated in the card 
to provide greater utility and portability. However, due to the complexity of its design, 
users need to consider the cost and administration maintenance of implementing a 
PKI against its benefits.  
3.8 Summary 
WLAN systems are beginning to incorporate a variety of new security architectures. It 
is important that an appropriate security mechanism is selected in order to comply 
with an organisation’s business policy.  
 
The security mechanisms discussed in this chapter are summarised showing their 
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OSI Layer Name Security Mechanism 
7 Application PKI, RADIUS, Kerberos, IPSec (IKE) 
6 Presentation  
5 Session SSL/TLS/SSH 
4 Transport  
3 Network IPSec (AH & ESP), PPTP 
2 Link 802.1X, L2TP, CHAP 
1 Physical WEP 
Table 3-3 OSI Model and Security Mechanisms 
Polices and resources developed for remote dial-up users may be helpful because of 
the similarity between a wireless and a dial-up client. Both are unknown users that 
must be authenticated before network access is granted, and the use of an untrusted 
network means that strong encryption is required. The next chapter reviews network 
performance issues, because associating cost factors (performance) with the quality of 




In this chapter, we discuss general performance metrics and variables, followed by an 
analysis of the current wireless LAN performance studies, and identify the gaps. In 
this chapter, we introduce the concept of treating security policies as “insurance 
policies”, using security and performance to provide optimal solutions. 
4.1 Performance Requirements 
In this section, the basic concepts of network performance are defined. Many factors 
affect performance and some of them interact to provide overall performance results. 
Performance results vary depending on the choice of hardware device, software 
application, and network topology. Common performance measurements [Cisco, 
1998; Bradner & McQuaid, 1999, Microsoft, 2000a; Yang, 2001] are as follows: 
 Response time measures the length of time required for traffic to travel 
between two points. It is usually referred to as the perceived time that 
passes before a user receives visual affirmation [Microsoft, 2000a].  
 Throughput is the amount of data transmitted over a network in a given 
time frame. It can be measured in the number of bytes per second.  
 Latency measures the time required to send a packet that is returned to 
the sender (the round trip time). If the data was transmitted instantly 
between two points, then there is no delay at all. Latency is often used to 
mean any delay or waiting that increases real or perceived response time 
beyond the response time desired. 
 Radio signal strength is the transmission strength of a wireless device; 
the higher the strength the lower the interference from items such as 
metal or microwaves. Distance between wireless devices also affects the 
radio signal strength. 
 Coverage area considers user density in a particular area to determine 
the cell range of an AP. Site surveys may be required to deliver a greater 
throughput by overlapping coverage areas. 
 50
 Mobility defines how much movement between coverage areas users 
need. 
 User population is the number of users in a wireless network and the 
quality of service expected by users. Scalability needs to be considered. 
For example, the number of active users per AP is critical in determining 
how many encrypted packets are transmitted from a user. 
 QoS priority is given to users or data types such as voice and video. 
 Network load is the density of a network, or how well a wireless link 
performs under various traffic loads. Weyuker and Avritzer [2002] 
studied the impact on web traffic under different loads and proposed a 
metric to predict network load bottlenecks under different loadings. 
 Bandwidth, for example, the 802.11b provides the maximum capacity 
of 11 Mbps transmission speed. 
 
Response time and throughput generally have an inverse relationship as network load 
increases [Jain et al., 1997]. RFC 1242 [Bradner, 1991] and 2544 [Bradner & 
McQuaid, 1999] provide a performance benchmarking methodology specifying other 
parameters such as packet sizes, inter-arrival packet rate, buffer control, and packet 
loss rate. This study conducted experiments in real-time instead of simulations; thus, 
only response time and throughput were used, while other variables were held 
constant.  
4.2 Performance Evaluation 
The performance of 802.11 WLANs is similar to shared Ethernets. Congestion occurs 
as more users are added. The theoretical throughput can be attained by using DCF 
(see Section 2.2.3) as 75% of the nominal bit rate [Gast, 2002], although a target of 
65% is commonly observed. Applying this formula to an 11 Mbps 802.11b network, 
this yields a practical throughput in the range of 6 to 8 Mbps. A comparison test was 
carried out on the 802.11a and 802.11b throughput limits [Xiao & Rosdahl, 2002], the 
author observed the limit for 802.11a was 30.34 Mbps and 6.44 Mbps for 802.11b. 
4.2.1 Wireless Performance 
Borisov et al. [2001] stated that “Security is a property of an entire system and every 
decision must be examined with security in mind”. Although this is certainly true, the 
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following studies clearly demonstrate there is a lack of attention paid to the effects of 
implementing security on wireless network performance. 
 
Empirical results from Bing and Subramanian’s [1998] study demonstrated that 
different modes of 802.11 WLAN and Ethernet frame size were crucial factors in the 
determination of a WLAN’s transmission capabilities. The throughput of a WLAN 
increased as the frame length increased and as the amount of broadcast traffic 
decreased. Furthermore, the authors suggested that the mean response times for both 
wired and wireless LANs were similar, with an interframe delay of 10 ms or more. 
However, a broader analysis conducted in Portugal’s Braganca City on its 802.11b 
metropolitan area network (MAN) found that 802.11b’s effective data transmission 
was far from the estimated value and had a higher latency than wired Ethernet [Amaro 
& Lopes, 2001]. Data monitored by the netpipe tool showed that a 10 Mbps cross- link 
Ethernet peaked at 8.4 Mbps with a block size of 8195 bytes, while for wireless 
networks, the larger the packet size, the higher the effective rate as shown in Figure 4-
1 (adapted from Amaro and Lopes [2001]). The collision avoidance mechanism of 
802.11b protocol confirmed this increase, as traffic overheads introduced by the 
control frames request to send/clear to send (RTS/CTS) and the ACK frame 
diminished for larger packets. Their tests transferred a 1 MB file (10 times) using FTP 
applications with four different network paths with two cells of single or multi-hops 
(see Table 4-1), based on Linux operating systems. Bi-directional throughput 
performed 50% better than unidirectional throughput. The path with more hops 
reduced the throughput almost to the unidirectional level. Delay introduced by routers 
had more performance cost in small packet sizes than the MAC overhead. Amaro and 
Lopes concluded that lower throughputs produced by wireless transmission were 
caused by overheads introduced by physical and link layer protocols. Moreover, larger 
networks with more hops increased latency, but the use of overlapping channels could 
provide higher throughput for larger block sizes. The 802.11a shows the same 
characteristics of achieving higher throughput with a larger packet size, although 
HiperLan/2 provided a higher data rate when transmitting MPEG files [Walke, 2002]. 
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Table 4-1 Maximum Throughputs with Different Topologies 
The 802.11b product performance test conducted by Avery [2001] did not test the 
network performance with the security mechanism activated. Instead, he evaluated the 
security of each product by “looking at options available to the system manager” for 
securing WLANs. Thus, he did not include the operational performance effects that 
each product would incur. However, his test showed that the performance test should 
use wired 10 Mbps Ethernet network performance as a benchmark, because Ethernet 
and 802.11b systems have similar data transmission speeds and infrastructure. 
 
Lezini and Mingozzi [2001] examined the performance optimisation of HiperLAN/2 
by fine-tuning its capacity request and allocation mechanisms for different types of 
traffic. Their simulation results showed that those mechanisms had the flexibility to 
accommodate the QoS requirements of delay-sensitive and pulsing data traffic 
streams.  
 
Chen [2001] carried out an experiment to compare the coverage area and performance 
between 802.11b (11 Mbps) and 802.11a (54 Mbps). He found that 802.11a provides 
2-to-5-times better data-link rate and throughput performance in the same range (77 
m) as 802.11b. As for co-channel interference, 802.11a produced better performance 
results than 802.11b. Chen also compared the trade-off between performance and 
costs in terms of range and total system capacity. 802.11a offered better system 
capacity with fewer cells (APs). With respect to security, he noted that the experiment 
was not subjected to “performance effects due to variability in software or higher 
layer protocols and applications”. Thus, security issues were not investigated.  
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Whitmore [2001] suggested that when implementing a “secure solution”, the 
architectural design of a network would have an effect on performance, such as a 
processing delay. Rodgers’ study [2001] on VPNs showed that implementing security 
mechanisms imposed a performance cost. Significant impacts from VPN security 
mechanisms were incurred on routed and non-routed VPN latency measurements. By 
configuring security layers using a firewall, authenticated tunnels, and DES and 3DES 
encryption, visible effects were observed; especially there was a dramatic increase of 
85% in latency for HTTP and FTP traffic in the authenticated tunnelled configuration. 
However, the security mechanisms of VPN had no significant impact on HTTP 
throughput. While very little change was experienced in FTP throughput, adding 
firewalls to the non-routed VPN environment caused a drop in throughput of 83.2%. 
Due to the nature of different network infrastructures, it was uncertain whether the 
security cost on performance would increase as interference increased in a wireless 
network environment. Our research provided an insight into wireless networks. 
4.3 Size Effect 
Company sizes, in terms of the number of computers, affect the way an organisation 
chooses to carry out its security and performance deployment. Some factors that 
contribute to the size effect include the vertical industry, operational models, company 
location, user distribution, and corporate financial health. In a survey conducted by 
Information Security magazine [Briney & Prince, 2002] in June 2002, the company 
discovered that “organisations of different sizes adhe re to distinct patterns of 
organisational behaviour when it comes to IT security.” The larger the company size, 
the more difficult it was to keep up with the demands of increasingly complex 
organisational infrastructures. Furthermore, the effectiveness of an incident recovery 
plan did not grow proportionally with company size. Spending money on security 
budgets may not reduce the level of incidents but does increase an organisation’s 
ability to detect its loss. The survey generalised four different company sizes: 
÷ Small (10-100 computers) 
The majority of small companies had a centralised IT organisational model with a 
proportional IT security budget. 
÷ Medium (100-1,000 computers) 
These companies had proportionally poorer deployment in respect to policy, model,  
and budget than other groups. 
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÷ Large (1,000-10,000 computers) 
Security has become institutionalised into the corporate culture via policies. 
However, these companies had the most user problems regarding training and 
management and user-awareness. 
÷ Very large (10,000+ computers) 
These institutions provide better policy adoption and resource allocation than large 
organisations, but have proportionally smaller budgets, as well as scalability issues 
with complex model designs, such as corporate- level and division- level policies. 
 
The survey showed that most companies still considered malicious code and 
unauthorised users as the most important security problems. Organisation 
management remained less concerned. 
4.4 Concept of Insurance Policies 
Schneider [2002] addressed security through incorporating a business risk 
management solution. This can be achieved by enforcing liabilities and giving 
corporate management the means to “reduce or insure” against those liabilities. 
Businesses manage risks by finding adequate security at a reasonable cost, or in other 
words, providing a price tag to network security and allowing a company to assess its 
return on investment (ROI) in a visible format. Schneider noted that, “businesses 
achieve security through insurance”, treating security as insurance policies bound by 
constraints such as standard security practices. For example, if users are concerned 
about denial-of-service attacks, a company can apply bandwidth interruption 
insurance. Premium calculation can include various factors such as money value, 
reputation rating, and performance costs. Security policies can be structured like fire 
or house insurance policies, with different customer types, classes of policies and 
various premium schemes. A data protection insurance policy requiring a personal 
software firewall, CHAP authentication, and no encryption may be offered to a small 
manufacturing company, costing the company a 10% performance reduction. 
4.5 Summary 
Various performance variables such as response time and throughput were discussed 
in this chapter. Prior studies showed there was a lack of performance evaluation of 
layered security frameworks for wireless networks. These studies concentrated on 
additional factors such as range or multi-hops. Other cost considerations included 
company size and treating security policies as insurance policies to provide incentives 




This chapter sets out the method and the environment used to conduct the experiments 
of this study. The aim of the experiments is to quantify the impact of security on 
performance of the 802.11b WLAN. The two AAA solutions for WLAN, the 802.1X 
and VPN, identified in Chapter 3, were selected as the two security models to assess 
the level of performance degradation. The 802.1X model includes the basic 802.11 
standard’s security using the WEP protocol and the enhanced security 802.1X 
standard with the EAP protocol. The VPN model includes the IPSec protocol suite for 
end-to-end security. A set of security layers was configured within each security 
model to carry out the experiment. Major differences between the two models can be 
identified: the VPN model requires endpoints to support the security mechanism, 
whereas the 802.1X model depends on the access point (acting as the authenticator) 
for support. 
5.1 Objectives of the Research 
The research goal of this study is to identify the performance and security issues of 
WLANs using layered security models. This goal is subdivided into three research 
questions: 
 Is the network performance of the model at each security level the 
same? 
 Are there any impacts on performance resulting from using the 802.1X 
and VPN models? 
 Does security have an impact on different traffic types? 
 
An additional outcome of the study is a proposed wireless security policy template 
based on the results of the experiments that provide tradeoffs between security and 
performance. This security policy template would become a factor in determining 
wireless security insurance. 
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5.2 Common Criteria Assessment 
Common Criteria 11 is an internationally recognised method for certifying the security 
of IT products and systems. It defines unique security standards and establishes 
procedures for independently evaluating the implementation of these standards in 
software and other IT products. It provides a “taxonomy for evaluating security 
functionality” [Whitmore, 2001] through a set of functional requirements, as defined 
in the following eleven classes [Common Criteria 1999]:  
÷ Security audit:  recognises, records, stores and analyses information related to 
relevant security activities, e.g. remote user access information. 
÷ Communication: assures the identity of parties involved in a data exchange 
(nonrepudiation). 
÷ Cryptographic support: supports high- level security objectives and key 
management. 
÷ User data protection: ensures user data will not be exposed to danger, via 
encryption and access control. 
÷ Identification and authentication: establishes and verifies a claimed user identity. 
÷ Security management: manages aspects of the security component such as the 
security component’s data and attributes. 
÷ Privacy: user protection against the discovery and misuse of a user’s identity by 
other users. 
÷ Protection of security functions: provides the integrity and management of the 
component that provides the security mechanisms. 
÷ Resource utilisation: utilises the performance of the component, such as resource 
allocation. 
÷ Component access: controls the establishment of a user session.  
÷ Trusted path/channel: provides a trusted communication path between user and a 
security component, e.g. a secured path between a remote user and an authentication 
server.  
                                                 
11 For more details see www.commoncriteria.org. 
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Common Criteria VPN Model (IPSec) 802.1X Model (EAP) 
Security audit √ Firewall and AS 
monitoring, e.g. RADIUS 
or Kerberos  
√ AP and AS monitoring such 
as RADIUS 
Communication √ Digital Certificate √ Digital Certificate (EAP-TLS) 
Cryptographic support √ IKE key management 
PKI 





User data protection √ DES and 3DES 
AS 
√ WEP or AES 13 
AS 
Security management √ Server √ Server 
Identification & 
authentication 
√ AS & firewall, and user 
login and password; need 
IPSec client software 
√ RADIUS server and EAP-TLS 
Privacy √ AS and VPN gateway √ AS and AP 
Protection of security 
functions  
√ Proprietary mechanisms  
Firewall 
Physical protection 
√ Proprietary mechanisms 
Physical protection 
Resource utilisation √ QoS 
Software compression 
√ QoS14 
Component access √ IKE for session key √ Session key moved from AS 
to AP over EAP-TLS 
Trusted path/channel √ Tunnelling √ PAE control 
Table 5-1 Security Architecture Evaluations by Common Criteria 
The 802.1X and the VPN models have been analysed using the eleven classes of 
Common Criteria (Table 5-1). Both models have met all the requirements of Common 
Criteria, although some functions may be related to proprietary mechanisms. 
Furthermore, because Common Criteria enforces more stringent requirements, the five 
security services of the OSI model are met: namely, authentication, access control, data 
confidentiality, data integrity and nonrepudiation. Thus, we satisfied Whitemore’s 
[2001] “duality of security” statement of “ensuring correct and reliable operation and 
protecting against error and maliciousness.”  
5.2.1 Product Comparison 
As noted in Section 5.2, Common Criteria is a security methodology for evaluating 
security products and systems. An assessment of existing WLAN products is shown in 
Table 5-2, the three products have met Common Criteria’s standards in supporting the 
802.1x model The VPN model requires endpoints to support the security mechanism, 
whereas the 802.1x model depends on the access point (acting as the authenticator) for 
support. 
                                                 
12 At the time of this writing, TKIP is under evaluation by the IEEE 802.11i working group.  
13 At the time of this writing, AES for 802.11 standard has been proposed but is still under development 
and AES-ready products are waiting for US government approval, such as a wireless manufacturer 
Symbol (for more details at www.symbol.com). 
14 See IEEE 802.11e workgroup on QoS deployment; currently there are several proposals for improving 
QoS in the MAC layer. 
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Table 5-2 Access Point Product Comparisons 
5.3 Security Configuration Levels 
The experiment tested each model at different security levels. The configuration level 
from one (lowest level of security) to ten (highest) is shown in Table 5-3. These security 
levels were implemented incrementally. The security configurations include a 
combination of authentication, authorisation and encryption mechanisms. 
5.3.1 802.1X Model 
There were nine security levels selected to present a hierarchical order of the security 
mechanisms available from both 802.11 and 802.1X standards. Hereafter, we will refer 
this model as the 802.1X model.  
 
 
                                                 









Access Point 8000 
Product 
   
1. Security audit SNMP, WEB, Telnet, 
Remote link test, 
TFTP 
SNMP, WEB, Telent, 
TFTP 
SNMP, 3Com Network 










3. Protection of 
security functions  
IEEE 802.1X enabled IEEE 802.1X enabled IEEE 802.1X enabled 
4. User data 
protection 
40-bit or 128-bit 
WEP, MAC address 
ACL 
























RADIUS, Cisco ACS 









Microsoft CHAP, LEAP 
EAP-TLS, Dynamic 
security link with XJACK 
antenna on client 
9. Trusted 
path/channel 
IEEE 802.1X port IEEE 802.1X port IEEE 802.1X port 
10.Communication Digital Certificate Digital Certificate  Digital Certificate 
11. Privacy 128-bit RC4, 
RADIUS 
128-bit RC4, RADIUS 128-bit RC4, RADIUS 
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The nine security levels of this model are: 
÷ Level 1 No security: this is the default security setting provided by vendors. There is 
no security mechanism activated with default configuration. 
÷ Level 2 MAC address authentication: this level provides MAC address 
authentication carried out at the AP. 
÷ Level 3 WEP authentication: the shared key authentication method specified in the 
802.11 standard is used. 
÷ Level 4 WEP authentication with 40-bit WEP encryption: this level combines the 
encryption algorithm to provide data privacy.  
÷ Level 5 WEP authentication with 128-bit WEP encryption: the 128-bit shared key 
used is proprietary-based (in the case of Lucent). 
÷ Level 6 EAP-MD5 authentication: this is one of the 802.1X standard’s 
authentication methods, using password/username. 
÷ Level 7 EAP-TLS authentication: this is the PKI-based authentication method 
supported by 802.1X. 
÷ Level 8 EAP-MD5 with 128-bit WEP encryption: the combined effect of these tools 
provides strong data protection. 
÷ Level 9 EAP-TLS with 128-bit WEP encryption: the combined effect of these tools 
provides the strongest level of encryption and authentication using per-session keys. 
 
The Security Levels 2 to 5 of the 802.1X model are consistent with the 802.11 standard. 
Security Levels 6 to 9 are provided by the 802.1X standard.  
5.3.2 VPN Model 
We define the VPN Model based on the IPSec suite. Tunnelling is achieved by operating 
L2TP/IPSec (transport mode option of IPSec) and we refer to this as the IPSec 
tunnelling technology. This is the end-to-end IPSec solution provided by Microsoft. 
There are two types of authentication methods deployed in our experiments:  
 Device authentication method using PKI with X.509 certificates 
 User authentication methods selected based on open-standards - CHAP 
and EAP-TLS.  
 
These two methods provide direct comparison with the authentication methods 
deployed in the 802.1X model. PPTP has been selected to provide a performance 
comparison with tunnelling techniques. Rincòn [2002] observed in his research that 
L2TP/IPSec tunnelling produced larger performance overheads than PPTP.  
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Ten security levels were specified: 
÷ Level 1 No security: this is the default security setting. Both the 802.lX and VPN 
models have this in common. 
÷ Level 2 PPTP tunnelling with CHAP: authenticated tunnel provided using PPTP 
tunnelling and CHAP authentication. 
÷ Level 3 IPSec tunnelling with CHAP: authenticated tunnel using IPSec tunnel and 
CHAP authentication.  
÷ Level 4 Firewall with PPTP and CHAP: introducing a firewall into the architecture 
to filter the network traffic. 
÷ Level 5 Firewall with IPSec and CHAP: a firewall is introduced into an IPSec based 
network. From this level onward, all the security levels will be based on IPSec design. 
÷ Level 6 Firewall with IPSec and EAP-TLS: applying user-based PKI with device-
based certificate authentication. 
÷ Level 7 IPSec with CHAP and DES: provides DES encryption to IPSec with CHAP 
user authentication. 
÷ Level 8 IPSec with EAP-TLS and DES: applies DES encryption to EAP-TLS user 
authentication. 
÷ Level 9 IPSec with CHAP and 3DES: provides strongest encryption (3DES) with 
CHAP. 
÷ Level 10 IPSec with EAP-TLS and 3DES: encrypts data traffic with the strongest 
encryption and user authentication methods. 
 
The VPN model can be grouped into two parts; Security Levels 2 to 4 require 
authentication and tunnelling using either PPTP or L2TP/IPSec before and after the 
firewall. Security Levels 5 to 10 requires IPSec protocol suite with a firewall to carry 
out authentication and encryption.  
5.3.3 Security Levels of 802.1X and VPN model 
Table 5-3 provides an overview of the security levels used in each model. 
 
Level 802.1X Model VPN Model 
1 No Security (Default Installation) 
2 MAC authentication PPTP Tunnelling & CHAP  
3 WEP authentication IPSec Tunnelling & CHAP  
4 WEP (40 bit) auth. & encryption Firewall with PPTP & CHAP 
5 WEP (128 bit) auth. & encryption Firewall with IPSec & CHAP 
6 IEEE 802.1X EAP-MD5 IPSec & EAP-TLS 
7 IEEE 802.1X EAP-TLS IPSec & CHAP & DES 
8 IEEE 802.1X EAP-MD5 & WEP encryption IPSec & EAP-TLS & DES 
9 IEEE 802.1X EAP-TLS & WEP encryption IPSec & CHAP & 3DES 
10 - IPSec & EAP-TLS & 3DES 
Table 5-3 Security Levels of the 802.1x Model and VPN Model 
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5.4 Test Environment 
The testbed configuration was based upon the traditional client/server architecture but 
using wireless connections. The only difference was that the data transferred in the 
experiments were wireless. The laboratory was designed as a ‘clean environment ’; that 
is, no background noise or other interferences was present. Each model was tested 
separately to measure the impact on network performance. 
5.5 Performance Measurements 
Response time and throughput (see Section 4.1 Performance Requirements) were the 
parameters chosen to provide a comprehensive view of the network performance. They 
are defined in this research as follows: 
÷ Response time: the total time required for traffic to travel between two points. Time 
is measured from the issuing of the connect command to the appearance of a 
disconnect message displayed by the client computer. The response time includes the 
time of dial-up connection establishment, security negotiation time between the client 
and the server and the actual transfer of the data (Figure 5-1). The time data were 










Policy Negotiation e.g. Authentication
Household rules e.g. DNS,  STP, ARP, NBNS




Figure 5-1 Response Time Measurement 
÷ Throughput: the number of bytes that can be transmitted over the network in a given 
time period. It is the size (z) divided by the response time (t), i.e. z/t. The transmitted 
data sizes were collected from the network monitoring tool. 
5.5.1 Application Protocol Types (FTP and HTTP) 
Application protocols consist mainly of bulk data transfer (file transfer), interactive 
transaction (request-reply exchange) and voice data. This research was concerned with 
the file transfer and interactive transaction types. We were interested in the ability of a 
WLAN to transfer data in a predefined file size and to measure the variation in 
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performance when security mechanisms are implemented. FTP file transfers and HTTP 
transactions were selected to carry out the measurements. 
 
The FTP file transfe r utilised a single 1MB Word document from the server to the 
client. HTTP transactions were carried out using free software, HTTrack16 [2002] which 
provides website mirroring capability. The HTTP session was defined using a mirroring 
link depth of four 17  on the University of Canterbury18  website and supporting eight 
simultaneous user connections. The experiment would entail accessing 70 links and 
downloading 69 files19 with a data size of 0.3 MB. 
 
The FTP and HTTP transaction sizes have been chosen to represent typical and non-
trivial data exchanges. The data transactions in the VPN model were not compressed in 
order to reflect a direct comparison against the 802.1X model. 
5.5.2 Measurement Tools 
Network monitoring was performed using the Ethereal [2002] application on the server. 
All measurements were collected from the server. 
 
Applications used to carry out the data transaction were: 
 Microsoft FTP version 5: a batch script to perform the transfer was 
written to be executed from the command line 
 HTTrack version 3.20: this free software provided website mirroring by 
simulating web surfing and users downloading data. 
5.6 Experiment Requirements 
The general software and hardware required to carry out the experiments are described 
in this section. Details of system configurations for the 802.1X and VPN models are 
specified in Chapter 6. 
 
                                                 
16 HTTrack allows user to download a web site from the Internet to a local directory, building recursively 
all directories, getting HTML, images, and other files from the server to a local computer. It arranges the 
original site's relative link-structure. Opening a page of the “mirrored” website in the user’s browser, and 
users can browse the site from link to link, as if the user were viewing it online.  
17 Users browse websites by clicking links to go onto the related web pages. 
18 The university site was downloaded to the web server at 31 July 2002. 
19 The number of links scanned and files downloaded by HTTrack program for mirroring website link 
depth to four. The information was provided by the program’s log at the completion of mirroring 
operation. 
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The experiment was conducted using Windows-based operating systems - Windows 
2000 Advanced Server and Windows XP. Lucent Orinoco AP-2000 access point was 
used as the medium between the server and the client to facilitate wireless connections. 
The components were as follows (Appendix B describes them in more detail): 
 The server used Windows 2000 Advanced Server platform to provide 
access controls. 
 The client used the Windows XP operating system, which supported 
802.1X authentications. 
 The AP used the Orinoco AP-2000 product. 
 
Transmission speeds used in the experiments: 
 Between the server and the AP was a 100 Mbps Ethernet connection 
 Between the AP and the client was an 11 Mbps wireless connection 
5.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we outlined the research objectives and the methods required to carry 
out our experiments. The 802.1X and VPN models were selected to measure 
performance degradation in the WLAN. Both models conformed to Common Criteria 
assessment categories, and a detailed security configuration breakdown is specified for 
these models. The test environment and limitations associated are discussed. 
Performance measurements and experiment requirements provide a general overview of 




Implementation of the Security Models 
In this chapter, we describe the design of the 802.1X and VPN models implemented in 
our experiments. These models are based on the security technology discussed in 
Chapter 3 and configured for our experiments as described in Chapter 5. Pilot testing 
was performed before the experiments to assess the usability of data collected. 
6.1 System Architecture Overview 
The experiment was divided into two parts, testing of the: (1) 802.1X model and  (2) 
VPN model. On the server side, the same basic system structure was used for both 
models although the system architectures differed in their interaction with the RADIUS 
server. The NAS (Figure 6-1) took the form of a RADIUS client. In the 802.1X model,  







Figure 6-1 System Architecture Overview 
6.1.1 Server Functionality 
Using a Windows-based platform requires minimal configuration of the client machine; 
Windows XP has integrated the functionalities and standards of the 802.11 wireless 
networks. Most of our configurations were performed on the server. The server acted as 
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a multipurpose machine (see Figure 6-2), with the following configurations carrying out 
specific functions (see Appendix B for Configuration Procedures): 
 DNS server: provides name resolution service and, in this case, functions 
as a domain controller.  
 Directory service: acts as the information repository containing user, 
machine, group and user-specific policies based on lightweight directory 
access protocol (LDAP) technology. The application used was active 
directory (AD). AAA servers such as the RADIUS and VPN servers can 
be integrated with the AD to provide a single sign-on to a network. 
 Web server: provides web monitoring and control using Microsoft 
internet information service (IIS). 
 FTP server: provides file access and transfer control using Microsoft FTP 
server. 
 Network monitor: monitors the network traffic using Ethereal. 
Figure 6-2 Logical Functionalities of the Server 
Three additional installations were required for both models: 
 RADIUS server: provides authentication and accounting remote users 
based on their credentials. 
 Certificate authority (CA, also known as certificate server): issues and 





















 VPN server: provides remote access control and monitoring of VPN users 
using Microsoft remote access server (RAS). 
 
An organisation may wish to deploy a DHCP server to perform automatic IP address 
issuing to wireless users. However, in Chapter 3, we discussed the vulnerabilities of 
using a DHCP server for wireless networks; thus, a DHCP server was not included in 
our design.  
6.1.2 Remote Access Policy Structure  
A directory-enabled network allows a network to be managed and controlled centrally; 
thus, policy deployment is carried out from the domain controller to the overall 
network. The network administrator can define and create remote access policies to 
control the level of remote access that a user or group of users has in Windows 2000 
Advanced Server. Users can be controlled and managed based on their roles and group 
association; for example, a user Ada Cornwell can have multiple roles and privileges 
(Figure 6-3). Remote access policies are a set of conditions and connection settings that 
must be met by users in order to gain network access. Using Group Policy (see 











Figure 6-3 User and Groups 
The RADIUS server or the VPN server can perform remote access control monitoring. 
Access control is enforced based on policies, either group- or user-specific. Integrating 
with the directory allows both servers to verify user identities and access authority. In 
Windows design, the user-specific policies in the directory override the policies defined 
in both servers (Figure 6-4). In the 802.1X model in our experiment, the RADIUS 
server and the AP formed the access control management. In the VPN model, the 
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Figure 6-4 Policy Structure 
The policy evaluation logic is illustrated in Figure 6-5 (adapted from Microsoft 
[1999b]). A wireless user is authenticated and connected to a network if a user has the 
permission and the right credential to access the network. The security communication 
































Figure 6-5 Policy Evaluation Logic Flow  
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6.2 802.1X Model Implementation 
The 802.1X model consisted of the 802.11 access mechanism using open and shared 
key authentication, WEP encryption, and the 802.1X port-based authentication. By 
combining 802.1X with 802.11 protocols (as security levels 6 to 9, see Table 5-3), the 
model provided a controlled wireless network with user identification, centralised 
authentication, and dynamic key management. 
 
The 802.11 access mechanism was tested for security levels 2 to 5. Static key 
management and basic network access was facilitated by the access point. For security 
levels 6 to 9, the integration of 802.1X and 802.11 provided a dynamic key management 
and centralised authentication by the RADIUS server (Figure 6-6). Authentication 
methods chosen for the experiment were the EAP-MD5 and EAP-TLS; other 
proprietary authentication methods such as EAP-TTLS were not considered. This model 
did not support end-to-end security, because privacy and confidentiality were only 
ensured on the wireless link by the WEP, but not enforced on the wired counterparts. 
 
Wireless users were treated as if they existed in one subnetwork in an organisation’s 
intranet. A specific IP address was assigned to the wireless user, AP, and different 
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Figure 6-6 802.1X Model Logical Flow 
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RADIUS server and certificate authorities were added to the basic network structure to 
provide the 802.1X authentication support (Figure 6-7). The RADIUS server supported 
wireless user sign-on, and a certificate authority was used to issue certificates to users 












Figure 6-7 802.1X Model Implementation 
6.2.1 Remote Access Policies 
In the 802.1X model, the RADIUS server and its client, AP-2000, performed the policy 
check and authentication. Policies are effective after the activation of the RADIUS 
server. The 802.1X standard specifies the use of RADIUS server for enhanced user 
authentication. In the 802.1X model, RADIUS server was activated after security level 
5 (see Section 5.3). The following remote access policies are based on this point. 
÷ General wireless access to the Intranet (see Appendix C)  
÷ Wireless user groups can access the organisation’s intranet via IEEE 802.11 
wireless transmission. Access can be further split into two policies for stricter control: 
 Wireless access control using EAP-MD5  
ü Access is granted to an organisation’s intranet if the wireless 
user possesses the right username and password, e.g. User Ada 
has been authenticated with login name ada@canterbury.ac.nz 
and password20. 
 
                                                 
20EAP-MD5 (equivalent to CHAP) requires the user password to be stored in reversible encrypted order; 
see Appendix B. 
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 Wireless access control using EAP-TLS  
ü Access is granted to an organisation’s intranet if the wireless 
user possesses the correct X.509 digital certificate, e.g. User Ada 
has been authenticated with her digital certificate “Ada 
Cornwell” 
6.3 VPN Model Implementation 
The VPN model deployed the IPSec mechanism to support an end-to-end secured 
communication from wireless to wired links. Tunnelling protocols used were IPSec and 
PPTP. Most of the testing was based on the IPSec mechanism. However, as PPTP is a 
popular VPN tunnelling choice used by organisations, we tested the effect of using 
PPTP tunnelling against IPSec at the early stage of the model. PKI was selected over 
preshared keys to identify a user, and X.509 certificates were used for distributing and 
authenticating the keys. User authentication alternatives elected were CHAP and EAP-
TLS. Chapter 3 explained that CHAP authentication is equivalent to EAP-MD5 
authentication.  
 
User authentication and tunnelling options were tested before and after the firewall 
installation in security levels 2 to 5. From there onwards, IPSec was the sole security 
protocol used with different user authentication alternatives. Security level 3 and levels 
5 to 10 provided both user and device authentications. Encryption mechanisms such as 
DES and 3DES were used to ensure end-to-end data protection. The network was 
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Figure 6-8 VPN Model Logical Structure 
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6.3.1 Additional Components 
In the VPN model, additional components were introduced into the network: RADIUS 
server, VPN server, certificate authority, and a firewall (Figure 6-9). The RADIUS 
server and certificate authority were installed during the 802.1X model experiment; 
thus, only a VPN server and a firewall were newly implemented (See Appendix B).  
 
We configured the VPN server to be the RADIUS client and a software firewall was set 
up between the access point and the VPN server. A hardware firewall was originally our 
first choice; however, vendor product interoperability issues occurred. Thus, a software 



















Figure 6-9 VPN Model Implementation  
6.3.2 Remote Access Policies 
In this model, the two types of access polices, device and user authentication, are 
defined. Device authentication is performed by the IPSec functions inside the VPN 
server using customised IPSec policies (see Section 3.6.3 IPSec). The automatic IPSec 
policy L2TP Rule21 provided by Microsoft was disabled because it provides HMAC-
MD5 as the hashing algorithm. Our customised IPSec policy allowed us to specify the 
use of a more secure hashing algorithm, HMAC-SHA1. The RADIUS server and the 
VPN server (RADIUS client) use policies similar to those specified in the 802.1X 
model in order to carry out user authentication. Furthermore, software compression was 
not used in the VPN model thus a direct comparison of transferred data size between the 
two models could be made. 
                                                 
21 For more information about how to use or disable this automatic rule, see Microsoft Knowledge Base 
Q248750 and Q310109. 
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6.3.2.1 IPSec Policy 
Our customised IPSec policy (see Appendix C) was assigned on both the server and the 
client machines.  
÷ Secure Remote Access 
÷ Policy negotiation requires a certificate authentication and HMAC-SHA1 hashing 
algorithm.  
 We used the customised filter with policy priorities of: 
ü ESP [3DES, HMAC-SHA1] 
ü ESP [DES, HMAC-SHA1] 
ü ESP [No encryption, HMAC-SHA1] 
6.3.2.2 User Access Policy 
User access policies were specified according to our experiment requirements. 
÷ General VPN access to the Intranet (see Appendix C) 
÷ The VPN user group (including the Wireless user group) can access the 
organisation’s intranet via a VPN connection. Access can be further split into two 
policies for stricter control: 
 VPN access control using CHAP authentication 
ü Access is granted to an organisation’s intranet if the VPN user 
possesses the right username, password and encryption type, e.g. 
User Ada has been authenticated with login name 
ada@canterbury.ac.nz, and a password, and 3DES encryption is 
used to protect the data transmission. 
 VPN access control using EAP-TLS authentication 
ü Access is granted to an organisation’s intranet if the VPN user 
possesses the right digital certificate and encryption type, e.g. 
User Ada has been authenticated with her digital certificate “Ada 
Cornwell”, and 3DES encryption is used to protect the data 
transmission. 
6.3.2.3 Firewall Rules 
A firewall was introduced in the VPN model; thus, associated rules need to be defined. 
Data transmissions are encapsulated; therefore, we only need to specify ports to enable 
the tunnelling and encapsulated data.  
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÷ VPN Transactions [Microsoft, 1999a] 
 UDP port 500 on both the inbound and outbound interfaces. 
 TCP port 1723 on both inbound and outbound interfaces. 
 Trust the IP address of the server and the client (or the IP port ID of 40, 
50, and 51). 
6.4 Pilot Testing 
During our implementation of the 802.1X model, we conducted a pilot test to assess the 
feasibility of our measurement point and test run numbers. The security levels tested 
were levels 1 to 5. Three tests were run for both FTP and HTTP traffic. The FTP 
transaction used five different file types to test the response time and throughput: text 
(50Kb) and Word document (1MB), and three multimedia files were used: PDF 
(5.95MB), MP3 (3.81MB) and MPEG (40MB). The HTTP transaction was tested with a 
single session surfing 70 links and downloading 69 files with total size of 333Kb. This 
HTTP transaction size was decided to present adequate user web surfing usage after a 
few adjustments to define the transaction size. 
 
Results from the FTP testing showed that throughput decreased when WEP 
authentication and encryption (40-bit and 128-bit) were implemented at levels 3 to 5. 
Multimedia file types provided a more visible degradation, with decreased throughput 
and increased response time. This could be due to the large file size and data type. The 
HTTP results showed that WEP authentication (level 3) and 128-bit WEP authentication 
and encryption (level 5) have impacts on performance. In addition, MAC address 
authentication (level 2) had a slight impact on performance. 
 
Overall, the results from the pilot test showed that performance degradation was 
experienced with WEP authentication and encryption for both the FTP and HTTP 
application protocols. However, at certain security levels, the impacts were insignificant 
and some security levels did not fulfil our security assumptions that the higher the 
security is, the higher the performance overheads. Analysis and reporting on the full 
experiments and their outcomes is covered in Chapter 7. 
 
Our investigation found that system factors, such as disk paging and memory caching, 
played a role during our testing period, because outlier data were collected. Research 
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carried out by Amaro and Lopes [2001] addressed similar issues by discarding the first 
file transfer, and allowing the file to be placed on the sender’s file system cache. We 
decided that three test runs for each file were not enough to accurately assess the 
models, due to the system factor influences. Thus, the experiment would be conducted 
using fifteen test runs, and the first five would be discarded to exclude system factors. 
The FTP file type was limited to a single Word document file to provide a more 
manageable data size. 
6.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we describe the separate implementation of two types of WLAN security 
models. Specific remote access policies were defined for each model to carry out the 
authentication, authorisation, and encryption mechanisms. Initial results from the pilot 
test showed that test runs needed to be carried out to remove system factors from the 
test environment. A secured WLAN must be balanced with performance to achieve an 
optimised solution.  
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CHAPTER 7 
Experimental Evaluation and Analysis 
In this chapter, we quantify the level of performance overhead incurred when 
implementing the different security mechanisms specified in Chapter 5. More 
specifically, we try to address the effect of security levels, models, and traffic types on 
performance. Data analysis was carried out by experimenting with different security 
mechanism deployment, and various combinations of these mechanisms. The statistical 
tools, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and t-tests (see Cooper and Schindler [2001] for 
analysis instruments), were used to analyse the data collected from the experiment. The 
analysed results will be combined with the security recommendations discussed in 
Chapter 3, as well as other performance parameters in Chapter 4, in order to build 
wireless security strategies. 
7.1 Experimental Result Overview 
The experiments followed the two models described in Chapter 5 - the 802.1X model 
and VPN model. An infrastructure mode of operation and a single cell were used with a 
single client. Performance measures were gathered by running ten repetitive tests with 
different security configurations for each model (see Appendix A Captured Data). FTP 
and HTTP traffic were captured by the Ethereal monitoring tool. Data were analysed, at 
the corresponding 95% confidence interval. 
 
Our research questions were constructed into the following null and alternative 
hypotheses: 
 There is no difference between the models implemented to secure WLAN 
transmission. The alternative hypothesis is that the VPN model presents 
more performance degradation than the 802.1X model. Statistical tests 
were performed using the t-test. 
 There is no difference between traffic types, while the alternative 
hypothesis assumes there is a difference. Statistical tests were performed 
using the t-test. 
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 There is no difference between security mechanisms applied in each 
model; while the alternative hypothesis assumes there is a difference. 
Statistical tests were performed using ANOVA and were followed by 
various t-tests.  
7.1.1 Retesting 
The data collected from the VPN model experiments showed surprising results. The 
results observed from security levels 4, 5, and 7 to 10 did not follow our assumptions 
that stronger security mechanisms have a greater performance impact. In particular we 
found that: 
 Implementing a firewall improved network performance. 
 CHAP user authentication increased response time more than EAP-TLS 
authentications. 
 3DES encryption improved the HTTP throughput compared to DES 
encryption. 
 
 A retesting was carried out on these security levels to investigate the causes. We 
decided to reboot the machines each time an IPSec policy was changed, thus avoiding 
previous IPSec policy presence. Comparison made on the data collected before and after 
retesting found that only the firewall security levels produced approximately the same 
results as before; other security levels followed our assumptions. Thus, we concluded 
that when implementing different IPSec policies/filters, for example if a user changed 
from DES to 3DES then the device should be restarted to avoid residual effects from 
previous policy implementation.  
7.2 Impact of Model Choice 
The results collected from the experiment rejected the null hypothesis and indicated that 
the VPN model produced higher performance overheads (see Table 7-1). Figures 7-1 
and 7-2 illustrate that the VPN model, on average, had longer response times and lower 
throughputs for FTP and HTTP traffic.  
 
Model 802.1X Model VPN Model
(Mean) Response Time Throughput Response Time Throughput
FTP 19.092 84454.360 45.632 39336.222
HTTP 25.571 19723.388 50.951 12054.027
 
Table 7-1 Mean Response Time and Throughput of the Two Models 
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Figure 7-2 Mean Throughputs in the Two Models 
The t-tests carried in Table 7-2 indicated that deploying different models to secure 
wireless transmission significantly affected the performance at p < 0.0000, regardless of 
which application protocol was used. The VPN model had more than doubled the 
response time for both FTP and HTTP traffic. The 802.1X model provided a much 
better throughput for FTP traffic. Implementing the security technologies of tunnelling, 
firewalls, device-based certificate authentication, sophisticated key exchange, and 
encryption algorithms contributed to these performance degradations. 
 
Model FTP HTTP
Res. Time Throughput Res. Time Throughput
t -statistics -9.1813 8.6089 -9.1132 8.4091
p -value* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
*Two-tailed at a = 0.05  
 




























7.3 Impact of Traffic Type on Performance 
Each model used two types of application protocols to transfer data: FTP and HTTP. 
FTP is used to transfer bulk file data, while HTTP exchanges a series of request-reply 
messages during the transmission period. In each model, the FTP response time and 
throughput were compared against HTTP. Table 7-3 illustrates the impact on 
performance using different traffic types within each model, the p-values were smaller 
than the alpha value of 0.05, and this indicated that type of traffic used significantly 
affected overall network performance. FTP performed better than HTTP, with faster 
response time and greater throughput, as shown in Table 7-1. The table also proved the 
point made in Section 7.2, that the 802.1X model performed better than the VPN model. 
Due to the nature of these transmission techniques and the different sizes of file used, 
this table provides only a limited view. For more detailed analyses of traffic type 
impacts, see Section 7.4. 
 
Traffic 802.1X Model VPN Model
Response Time Throughput Response Time Throughput
t-statistics -28.0239 17.4831 -9.7957 11.5024
p-value* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
*Two-tailed at a = 0.05  
Table 7-3 FTP vs. HTTP Performance in the Two Models  
7.4 Impact of Security Levels 
The data collected from experiments were evaluated by ANOVA, testing the overall 
impact of the various variables (security levels with regards to traffic types) on 
performance in the two models. However, ANOVA does not provide explanations for 
the differences or a detailed understanding of the interactions. Deploying paired t-tests 
provides a more detailed analysis of the impact on performance from different security 
levels.  
7.4.1 Overall Differences Among Security Levels 
There were four two-way ANOVA tests conducted to determine the overall security 
levels and traffic type impact within each model. The ANOVA tested two factors –
security levels (in each model) and traffic type, and considered the effects of these two 
factors jointly to see if there was an interaction effect. Significant interaction effects 
between these two factors were found at the 0.05 level for each model, as shown in 
Table 7-4. Therefore security levels and traffic type jointly impact network performance 
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(response times and throughputs). Thus, the individual main effects (from each factor) 
on performance could not be considered separately. In other words, when testing impact 
on performance, security level and traffic types need to be considered jointly.  
 
ANOVA  802.1X Model
Response Time Throughput 
df F ratio p-value* F ratio p-value*
Security Levels (e) 8 2737.25 0.0000 692.14 0.0000
Traffic Types (f) 1 1542.53 0.0000 14662.81 0.0000
Interaction (e*f) 8 12.91 0.0000 451.67 0.0000
VPN Model
Response Time Throughput 
df F ratio p-value* F ratio p-value*
Security Levels (e) 9 1600.16 0.0000 997.31 0.0000
Traffic Types (f) 1 164.80 0.0000 5647.17 0.0000
Interaction (e*f) 9 10.31 0.0000 458.92 0.0000
*Two-tailed at a = 0.05  
Table 7-4 ANOVA Analysis of Overall Security Levels 
The results of ANOVA provide sufficient empirical evidence that there were 
performance differences among security levels used in each model (see descriptive 
statistics in Table 7-5 for 802.1X model and Table 7-8 for VPN model). The response 
times and throughputs of traffic types (FTP and HTTP) showed that security levels 
significantly differ from each other in their effect on performance (p-value <0.0000); 
see Table 7-4 for details. The data used for ANOVA analysis were based on Appendix 
A Captured Data.  
7.4.2 Security Mechanisms of the 802.1X Model  
Following the rejection of our null hypothesis that there are no differences in 
performance among security levels, we further investigate the impacts and interaction of 
each security level in the 802.1X model. The mean level and standard deviation of 
response time and throughput observed on each of the security level are given in Table 
7-5, while Table 7-6 presents the overview of different paired t-tests. Table 7-5 provides 
abbreviated information on each security level; for more details refer to Table 5-3 in 
Chapter 5.  
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802.1X Model Response Time(sec) Throughput(bytes/sec)
Security Level FTP HTTP FTP HTTP
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1. No Security 9.618 0.686 16.721 1.136 117890.65 8348.549 25487.72 1730.131
2. MAC A. 9.174 0.430 16.407 0.996 122969.98 5566.224 25824.15 1539.270
3. WEP A. 8.911 0.393 17.768 0.687 126664.58 5767.990 23887.46 924.744
4.WEP A+E(40) 9.002 0.611 17.001 0.893 126001.48 8757.337 25143.60 1279.126
5. WEPA+E(128) 10.783 0.785 17.078 1.565 105059.29 7386.367 25094.41 2189.589
6. MD5 A. 20.544 1.450 24.665 1.570 55153.62 4090.844 17201.31 1155.156
7. TLS A. 22.909 2.409 26.176 1.130 49899.18 5168.803 16272.91 675.036
8. MD5 A+E(128) 39.751 0.398 46.889 0.817 28707.79 271.962 9438.67 194.491
9. TLS A+E(128) 41.135 0.719 47.434 1.120 27742.67 471.077 9160.26 238.217
 
Table 7-5 Descriptive Statistics of 802.1X Model 
The paired t-tests carried out in Table 7-6 used Pair numbers to identify the tests 
evaluating two specific groups. We selected these ten pairs instead of carrying out all 
the t-tests for every security level because some security levels are mutually exclusive, 
and the hierarchical nature of the model can provide related results on the higher 
security levels. The reasons for choosing each pair are as follows: 
÷ Pair 1 – compares the MAC address authentication against the default setting (no 
security protection at all). The default security setting requires comparison with only 
one security level, as previous results in ANOVA have identified that there are 
differences among security levels already. Results from Pair 1 will help us make some 
hierarchical assumptions about default security against the remaining eight security 
levels. 
÷ Pair 2 – compares the differences between MAC and WEP authentication impact. 
÷ Pair 3 – compares the impact of deploying 40-bit WEP encryption with simple WEP 
authentication. 
÷ Pair 4 – compares the authentication methods from the 802.11 and 802.1X standard, 
more specifically EAP-MD5 against WEP. 
÷ Pair 5 - compares the differences between different key lengths of 40- and 128-bits 
used by the WEP protocol. 
÷ Pair 6 – compares the difference between two authentication methods when both 
used 128-bit WEP encryption. 
÷ Pair 7 – compares the password based authentication, MD5, and the certificate based 
authentication, TLS. 
÷ Pair 8 – evaluates the impact of adding WEP encryption onto the EAP-MD5 
authentication method. 
÷ Pair 9 – compares the differences between EAP-MD5 and EAP-TLS authentication 
when combined with WEP 128-bit encryption. 
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Table 7-6 802.1X Security Performance Comparison 
The Pair ordering for the t-test comparisons in Table 7-6 were based on the level of 
security protection from the lowest protection level (1) to the highest (10). The 
following analysis were also organised on the level of security quality, thus some of the  
Pair numbers would not be in order in certain sections. The percentage change 
calculated for each Pair comparison was based on Table 7-5’s mean values.  
7.4.2.1 Impact of MAC Authentication 
When the AP was configured to provide MAC address authentication to wireless 
clients, there was no significant change in the response time and throughput of FTP and 
HTTP. In Table 7-6, Pair 1 shows that p-values for response time of FTP (p = 0.0756) 
and HTTP (p = 0.2168) are greater than 0.05. Similar results occurred for the 
throughput of FTP (p = 0.0904) and HTTP (p = 0.2748). The data used for comparison 
is shown in Table 7-7 (extracted from Table 7-5). 
 
802.1X Model Response Time(sec) Throughput(bytes/sec)
Security Level FTP HTTP FTP HTTP
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1. No Security 9.618 0.686 16.721 1.136 117890.65 8348.549 25487.72 1730.131
2. MAC A. 9.174 0.430 16.407 0.996 122969.98 5566.224 25824.15 1539.270  
Table 7-7 No Security and MAC Address Authentication Comparison 
Because the t-tests results indicate that no significant performance degradation when the 
MAC address authentication is deployed, the MAC address authentication should be 
used whenever possible to provide an extra measure of protection. 
7.4.2.2 Impact of WEP Authentication 
Implementing WEP authentication (shared key authentication) on both the AP and the 
wireless clients had no significant effect on the response time (p = 0.0654) and 
throughput (p = 0.0655) of FTP, as indicated in Pair 2 in Table 7-6. However, the 
802.1X Model Response Time Throughput
Security FTP HTTP FTP HTTP
Pair Levels t-stats p-value* t-stats p-value* t-stats p-value* t-stats p-value*
1. No Sec vs MAC 1 vs 2 1.5682 0.0756 0.8194 0.2168 -1.4510 0.0904 -0.6218 0.2748
2. MAC vs WEP A. 2 vs 3 1.6628 0.0654 -3.0733 0.0066 -1.6615 0.0655 3.0013 0.0075
3. WEP for E. 3 vs 4 -0.3913 0.3523 2.0521 0.0352 0.1962 0.4244 -2.3932 0.0202
4. WEP vs MD5 A. 3 vs 6 -22.9647 0.0000 -12.8921 0.0000 28.6970 0.0000 15.0648 0.0000
5. WEP E.40 vs E.128 4 vs 5 -6.8860 0.0000 -0.1280 0.4505 7.0540 0.0000 0.0591 0.4771
6. WEPvs MD5 A.&E. 5 vs 8 -110.9027 0.0000 -55.0430 0.0000 32.8324 0.0000 22.4167 0.0000
7. MD5 vs TLS A. 6 vs 7 -2.9566 0.0080 -3.0331 0.0071 2.7835 0.0106 2.4978 0.0170
8. MD5 for E. 6 vs 8 -37.9875 0.0000 -40.9776 0.0000 20.2079 0.0000 22.2382 0.0000
9. TLS for E. 7 vs 9 -2.2191 0.0127 -39.1071 0.0000 13.1118 0.0000 29.6240 0.0000
10. MD5 vs TLS A&E. 8 vs 9 -5.7881 0.0001 -1.1870 0.1328 6.0931 0.0001 2.7806 0.0107
*One-tailed at a = 0.05
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HTTP traffic experienced a slight increase in response time (p = 0.0066) and a drop in 
throughput (p = 0.0075) of around 7.5%, respectively. 
 
These results indicate that a request-reply message exchange format requires more 
frequent use of WEP authentication. 
7.4.2.3 Impact of 802.1X Authentication Methods  
Deploying the 802.1X authentication methods require a RADIUS server and AP support 
as a RADIUS client. Pair 4 (see Table 7-6) examined the implementation of EAP-MD5 
against the WEP authentication; the authentication method imposed a very significant 
delay in the network for FTP of 130.6%, or 11.633 seconds (p = 0.0000). The HTTP 
response time also showed a smaller performance impact of 38.8%, or 7.587 seconds (p 
= 0.0000). The FTP throughput was reduced by 56.5%, while throughput of HTTP was 
reduced by 28%. 
 
Pair 7 in Table 7-6 evaluated the different authentication methods used by the 802.1X 
standard. Using the EAP-TLS authentication significantly increased both FTP and 
HTTP response times by 3.434 seconds (16.7%) and 1.511 seconds (6.1%), 
respectively. FTP and HTTP throughputs provided similar results, reducing throughput 
by 9.5% and 5.4%, respectively. 
 
These results indicate that when incorporating AAA architecture into the network, extra 
overheads are created, as more authentication frames are transferred over the wireless 
network. These authentication frames impose significant performance degradation. A 
large increase in response time and decreased throughputs is experienced when 
changing basic WEP authentication to more complicated authentication methods. Using 
certificates instead of username/password methods also introduces another layer of 
performance overheads, as the EAP-TLS technique requires mutual authentication and 
provides better key management.  
7.4.2.4 Impact of WEP Encryption 
The addition of WEP encryption had no significant effect on the response time and 
throughput of FTP, as indicated in Pair 3 in Table 7-6. However, encryption caused a 
decrease of 4.32% in the response time (p = 0.0352) and a slight increase in throughput 
of 5.26% (p = 0.0202) in HTTP.  
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Pairs 8 and 9 in Table 7-6 evaluated the effect of WEP encryption when using different 
authentication methods (EAP-MD5 and EAP-TLS). FTP response time was increased 
by 93.5%, or 19.207 seconds, while HTTP produced delays of 90.1%, or 22.224 
seconds. Both FTP and HTTP throughputs were decreased, by 47.9% and 45.1%, 
respectively. For Pair 9, deploying encryption on top of the EAP-TLS authentication 
increased FTP response time of 79.6% (18.226 seconds) and HTTP’s by 82.2% (21.258 
seconds). The throughput for both FTP and HTTP dropped roughly the same amount, 
by 44.4% and 43.7%, respectively. 
 
These results show that encrypting traffic using WEP causes different results depending 
on the type of authentication method used in conjunction with WEP. If encryption is 
used with WEP, there is no burden created on the network for HTTP traffic result (But 
depends on the key sizes, see Section 7.2.2.5 for key lengths). However, if 802.1X 
authentication methods are used, a greater impact is experienced. Adding encryption 
with certificates imposes a longer response time, as per-session keys are generated and 
transferred from the RADIUS server to the AP. Also the AP wraps the key into a 
package, introducing more overheads. Request-reply traffic is degraded, as its messages 
require more processing. 
7.4.2.5 Impact of Key Lengths  
Pair 5 (see Table 7-6) compared the differences between key lengths of 40-bit and 128-
bit used by the WEP protocol. FTP transmissions were significantly delayed, by an 
additional 1.781 seconds, or 19.78% (p = 0.0000). Using a longer key length created a 
drop in FTP throughput of 16.62% (p = 0.0000). No significant effect was found in 
HTTP response time and throughput. 
 
These results show that as the key length increases, bulk file transfers exhibit significant 
differences in performance because packets are encrypted and decrypted with a longer 
key. 
7.4.2.6 Integrated Authentication and Encryption Effect 
The addition of WEP encryption had a significant affect on overall FTP and HTTP 
traffic between different authentication methods. Pair 6 in Table 7-6 examined the 
performance impacts of WEP and EAP-MD5 authentication methods with encryption, 
which demonstrated a dramatic increase in response time of FTP by 268.6%, or 28.968 
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seconds (p = 0.0000). The HTTP response times exhibited similar behaviour, with a 
157.3% delay, or 29.811 seconds. Throughputs for both traffic types dropped, by 72.7% 
for FTP and by 62.4% for HTTP. 
 
Pair 10 tested the effects of using different 802.1X authentication methods with WEP 
encryption. A slight increase in response time of 3.5% (or 1.384 seconds) was 
experienced by FTP, while HTTP showed no significant change. Small reductions in 
throughput were experienced by FTP and HTTP, at 3.4% and 3.0%, respectively. 
 
These results indicate that encrypting traffic poses a substantially greater burden on a 
network depending on the type of authentication methods deployed. A jump from 
authentication to incorporating encryption creates additional performance overheads and 
greater latency when using 802.1X-based authentications. Within the 802.1X 
authentication range, however, certificates generate only a slight impact on network 
performance. 
7.4.3 Security Mechanisms of the VPN Model 
Following the rejection of our null hypothesis that there were no performance 
differences caused by security levels, we further investigated the impacts and interaction 
of each security level in the VPN model. The mean level and standard deviation of 
response time and throughput observed on each security level are given in Table 7-8, 
while Table 7-9 presents the overview of different paired t-tests. For more detail on the 
security level information see Table 5-3 in Chapter 5. 
 
VPN Model Response Time Throughput
Security Level FTP HTTP FTP HTTP
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1. No Security 9.618 0.686 16.721 1.136 117890.65 8348.549 25487.72 1730.131
2. PPTP+CHAP 33.203 0.975 36.448 4.213 35624.95 996.544 13055.80 1412.334
3. IPSec+CHAP 34.440 0.523 39.216 1.709 35462.77 634.893 12788.32 513.672
4. FW+PPTP+CH 25.980 2.752 30.489 1.869 46169.94 4704.064 15222.38 876.847
5. FW+IPSec+CH 25.279 1.999 32.219 2.480 48980.74 3818.477 15251.68 1164.802
6. IPSec+TLS 31.221 2.765 39.022 2.015 39849.83 3400.824 12669.40 626.497
7. IPSec+CH+DES 59.268 4.748 74.121 2.357 21072.77 1691.461 6747.00 225.149
8. IPSec+TLS+DES 86.227 3.115 88.844 2.224 14471.88 510.871 5702.64 178.577
9. IPSec+CH+3DES 64.082 2.341 64.169 3.345 19416.39 651.325 7823.25 423.599
10. IPSec+TLS+3DES 87.000 4.345 88.259 6.067 14422.30 840.074 5792.08 388.031  
 
Table 7-8 VPN Model Descriptive Statistics 
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As we noted in Section 7.4.2, the following paired t-tests are selected in Table 7-9 were 
based on the mutual exclusivity22 of certain security levels and the hierarchical nature23 
of the model. The Pair numbers indicate the test comparison of two security levels. 
Explanations for the following 11 pairs are: 
÷ Pair 1 – compares the difference between no security protection and PPTP 
tunnelling with CHAP authentication. 
÷ Pair 2 – compares different tunnelling technologies, PPTP and IPSec, using the 
same authentication method. 
÷ Pair 3 – measures the impact of implementing a firewall onto PPTP-based VPN. 
÷ Pair 4 – measures the impact of introducing a firewall onto IPSec-based VPN. 
÷ Pair 5 – compares different user authentication methods (CHAP and EAP-TLS) 
used on top of IPSec technology. 
÷ Pair 6 – evaluates the impact of adding the DES encryption algorithm onto CHAP 
authentication. 
÷ Pair 7 – compares the impact of using DES encryption with EAP-TLS 
authentication. 
÷ Pair 8 – compares different authentication methods, CHAP and EAP-TLS, when 
both deploy the DES encryption. 
÷ Pair 9 – compares the impact of different encryption mechanisms (DES and 3DES) 
based on CHAP authentication. 
÷ Pair 10 – compares the impact of different encryption mechanisms based on EAP-
TLS authentication. 
÷ Pair 11 – compares different authentication methods, CHAP and EAP-TLS, when 
both deploy 3DES encryption. 
 
VPN Model Response Time Throughput
Security FTP HTTP FTP HTTP
Pair Levels t-stats p-value* t-stats p-value* t-stats p-value* t-stats p-value*
1. No Sec vs PPTP 1 vs 2 -80.8160 0.0000 -14.5848 0.0000 32.5071 0.0000 18.4451 0.0000
2. PPTP vs IPSec 2 vs 3 -3.8095 0.0021 -2.0804 0.0336 0.4575 0.3291 0.6128 0.2776
3. PPTP for FW 2 vs 4 7.6081 0.0000 4.4003 0.0009 -6.9174 0.0000 -4.5302 0.0007
4. IPSec for FW 3 vs 5 14.8094 0.0000 6.4247 0.0001 -11.4177 0.0000 -5.4200 0.0002
5. IPSec CHAP vs TLS A. 5 vs 6 -8.4820 0.0000 -5.1926 0.0003 8.6541 0.0000 4.9297 0.0004
6. IPSec CHAP for DES 5 vs 7 -18.2762 0.0000 -37.4617 0.0000 18.4612 0.0000 22.1177 0.0000
7. IPSec TLS for DES 6 vs 8 -44.7812 0.0000 -52.1968 0.0000 23.7330 0.0000 33.8450 0.0000
8. CHAP vs TLS for DES 7 vs 8 -15.0010 0.0000 -11.5508 0.0000 11.6590 0.0000 9.6595 0.0000
9. CHAP DES vs 3DES 7 vs 9 -2.7838 0.0106 7.4969 0.0000 2.7276 0.0117 -7.0237 0.0000
10. TLS DES vs 3DES 8 vs 10 -0.4863 0.3192 0.2559 0.4019 0.1617 0.4375 -0.5875 0.2857
11. CHAP vs TLS for 3DES 9 vs 10 -14.4553 0.0000 -13.0008 0.0000 14.7083 0.0000 12.5331 0.0000
*One-tailed at a = 0.05  
Table 7-9 VPN Security Performance Comparisons 
                                                 
22 For example, when users choose security level 7 they cannot have security level 8. 
23 The higher the security level the stronger the protection. 
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The Pair ordering for the t-test comparisons in Table 7-9 were based on the level of 
security protection from the lowest protection level (1) to the highest (10). The 
following analysis were also categorised on the level of security quality, thus some of 
the Pair numbers would not be in order in certain sections. The percentage change 
calculated for each Pair comparison was based on Table 7-8’s mean values.  
7.4.3.1 Impact of Authenticated Tunnels 
When the server and clients were configured to create authenticated tunnels, the 
response times and throughputs changed significantly. In Pair 1, FTP response time 
more than doubled, affecting network performance an increase of 245.2%, or 23.58 
seconds. HTTP traffic experienced significant delay over the tunnel of 118%, or 19.726 
seconds. Throughput decreases varied; throughput of FTP dropped 70% and HTTP 
throughput decreased 48.8%. 
 
Pair 2 analysed the performance differences between tunnel protocol types. Only 
response times showed significant differences, with FTP response time increasing by 
3.7% (1.237 seconds) and HTTP by 7.6% (2.768 seconds). 
 
The effect of encapsulating and decapsulating traffic as well as verifying checksums in 
order to sustain an authenticated tunnel created a substantial cost, causing the level of 
response time and throughput to change substantially. In addition, different types of 
tunnelling protocol imposed a slight delay on FTP traffic. 
7.4.3.2 Impact of Firewalls 
The introduction of firewalls to the VPN improved the response time for FTP by 21.8%, 
or 7.223 seconds in Pair 3. It examined the differences between PPTP with and without 
a firewall, and HTTP also exhibited a significance difference, response time improved 
by 16.3% (5.959 seconds). Throughputs increased by 29.6% and 16.6% for FTP and 
HTTP, respectively. 
 
Pair 4 tested the performance differences between IPSec with and without a firewall, 
and significant differences were found. Response times decreased by 17.8 % (6.998 
seconds) for FTP, and 26.6% (9.161 seconds) for HTTP. FTP traffic experienced a 
significant increase in throughput by 38.1%, while HTTP throughput increased by 
19.3%. 
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Implementing a firewall decreases response times and increases throughput. These 
results do not follow the normal assumption of implementation of firewalls: that 
network performance is degraded because there are extra checkpoints filtering network 
traffics. See Section 7.5.2.2 for a detailed discussion. 
7.4.3.3 Impact of User Authentication Methods  
User authentication type was reconfigured at the client to test the effect of using 
different methods. Pair 5 tested CHAP and EAL-TLS authentications and showed 
significant differences in response time and throughput for FTP and HTTP. There were 
increases in response times of 5.942 seconds (23.5%) for FTP and 6.804 seconds 
(21.1%) for HTTP. Throughputs for FTP and HTTP decreased at approximately the 
same rate (18.6% and 16.9%, respectively). 
 
Using certificate-based authentication generates more latency and reduces network 
throughput more than a simple username/password method.  
7.4.3.4 Impact of Encryption 
Adding DES encryption caused significant increases in response time for both FTP and 
HTTP transfers. Pair 6 tested adding DES encryption with CHAP authentication, and 
the response times for both FTP and HTTP were increased by 134.5% (33.987 seconds) 
and 130.1% (41.902 seconds), respectively, their throughputs reduced by half (57.0% 
for FTP and 55.7% for HTTP).  
 
Pair 7 tested adding DES to the EAP-TLS authentication. Similar results were found to 
Pair 6, the response times for FTP and HTTP decreased by 176.2% (55.006 seconds) 
and 127.7% (49.821 seconds), respectively. As for the throughputs, FTP experienced a 
63.7% drop, while HTTP dropped approximately the same rate as the Pair 6 analysis, at 
55.0%. 
 
Reconfiguring the encryption algorithm to 3DES also produced significant changes. 
Pair 9 and Pair 10 tested adding the 3DES encryption algorithm. Pair 9 showed that 
configuring CHAP authentication with 3DES encryption increased the FTP delay 
slightly by 8.1% (4.815 seconds). However, HTTP response time was decreased by 
13.4% (9.952 seconds). The choice of encryption algorithm had smaller impacts on 
throughputs, reducing it by 7.9% for FTP, but increasing HTTP throughput by 16%. 
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However, results from Pair 10 showed that the encryption algorithm used did not have 
any significant effect on the response times and throughputs for FTP and HTTP. 
 
Encrypting traffic posed a substantially greater burden than merely tunnelling it, 
although the effect of tunnelling is mostly wasted without encryption. The decision of 
which cryptographic methods to deploy had a definite performance degradation on FTP 
traffic, but improvement on HTTP trans fers. The type of user authentication chosen 
were also a factor when it interacted with the encryption algorithm; when using digital 
certificates, there were no performance differences between the encryption methods 
chosen. 
7.4.3.5 Integrated Authentication and Encryption Effect 
Pair 8 and Pair 11 evaluated the interaction of different authentication methods with 
different levels of encryption algorithm. Using different authentication methods with the 
same encryption technique produced significant changes in response time for FTP, with 
a noticeable increase of 45.5% (26.959 seconds), and an increase of 19.9% (14.723 
seconds) for HTTP. Throughputs were reduced by 31.3% for FTP and 15.5% for HTTP.  
 
Pair 11 compared the differences between two authentication systems for 3DES, and 
significant impacts were observed by FTP and HTTP. Response times for FTP imposed 
an additional delay of 35.8% (22.917 seconds), and for HTTP a 37.5% delay (24.09 
seconds). Throughputs for both types dropped approximately the same percentage of 
26%. 
 
The interaction of different authentication and encryption methods produced significant 
impacts on performance. If the same encryption method is deployed, then the choice of 
user authentication creates substantial performance overheads and longer response times 
regardless of which encryption algorithm is used. 
7.5 Discussion 
As the security level gets higher, the general trend is increased response times and 
decreased throughputs. The charts from Figures 7-3 to 7-6 present overviews of the 
security mechanisms’ impacts on performance. The 802.1X model provides better 
response times and throughputs than the VPN model; the IPSec-based VPN model 
provides end-to-end security that produces more performance overheads. We found that 
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FTP performed better than HTTP, because the nature of their transmission is different 
and means that HTTP requires more interaction between the server and the client. 
However, during the security level analysis (Section 7.4), some security mechanism 
impacted FTP transactions more than the HTTP 24. Providing same data file sizes for 








































Figure 7-4 HTTP Mean Response Times of Two Models’ Security Levels 
Inverse relationship was found in both 802.1X and VPN models between response time 
and throughput: as response time increased throughput decreased. See Figures 7-3 and 
7-5 for FTP traffic and Figures 7-4 and 7-6 for HTTP traffic. 
 
                                                 
24 For example, when choosing EAP-MD5 authentication in the 802.1X over WEP authentication, the 





















Figure 7-5 FTP Mean Throughputs of Two Models’ Security Levels 
 
Figure 7-6 HTTP Mean Throughputs of Two Models’ Security Levels 
7.5.1 802.1X Model 
Deploying the 802.1X infrastructure causes increased performance degradation 
compared to the 802.11 standard.  
7.5.1.1 Authentication 
MAC address authentication produces no performance overheads when compared to the 
default security setting, and thus should be used at all times. The 802.11 standard’s 
WEP (shared key) authentication creates a positive effect on FTP throughput but 
decreased HTTP throughput by 7.5%. Since the effect is small, WEP authentication 




















The result of deploying AAA architecture imposes significant performance degradation. 
Using 802.1X authentications methods degraded network performance significantly 
compared to WEP authentication. Furthermore, EAP-TLS produced more performance 
impacts than EAP-MD5, as it provides mutual authentication and key management. 
7.5.1.2 Encryption 
WEP encryption improved the network performance slightly, at approximately 5% in 
HTTP. However, different longer key lengths 128 bits impacted FTP performance less 
than 20%. Depending on the nature of traffic transmission, the strongest key length 
should be deployed.  
 
When adding WEP encryption onto 802.1X authentications, more specifically, EAP-
MD5, dramatic degradations are experienced with 100% increases in response times and 
50% decreases in throughputs for both traffic types. Certificate-based authentication 
with WEP encryption provided similar results. 
7.5.1.3 Interaction between Authentication and Encryption 
When comparing the combined effect of authentication methods and encryption, the 
overall degradation was severe. For FTP, the response time increased by more than 
268% and throughput reduced by 73%. HTTP experienced similar results at a smaller 
rate. These results indicate that encrypting traffic poses a substantially greater burden, 
but depending on the type of authentication method deployed. Between EAP-MD5 and 
EAP-TLS, the performance impact was minimal, at approximately 3%. 
7.5.2 VPN Model  
Implementing a VPN model provided stronger protection with complex cryptographic 
methods, and better key management.  
7.5.2.1 Tunnelling 
An authenticated tunnel created a dramatic response time delay of more than 245% for 
FTP and 113% for HTTP. Throughputs were reduced by more than 50%. The latency 
was greater than Rodgers’ finding of 85%, but his study did not observed any impact on 
throughput. This may be due to the transaction size or the transmission medium 
differences. Different tunnelling technologies impacted only the response time of the 
traffic; with HTTP traffic affected slightly. Certificate-based authentication (EAP-TLS) 
generated more than 20% delay and reduced throughput by 17% for all traffic types. 
 92
7.5.2.2 Firewalls 
Implementing a firewall actually improved the network performance by more than 15% 
regardless of which tunnelling protocol was used. This finding contrasts with the 
observation made in Rodgers’ [2001] study that firewalls degrade network performance 
by more than 30%. The difference between our research and Rodger’s were due to (1) 
software and hardware firewall, and (2) end-to-endpoints and between security 
gateways. IPSec protection was provided by the hardware firewall in Rodgers’ research, 
while we provided the protection at endpoints. 
 
Since the number of packets before and after the firewall implementations are roughly 
the same, the only factor altered was the response time. One possible explanation could 
be that the software firewall and router reside on the same Windows machine causing 
side effects that produce positive results on network performance (for example, 
interactions between the firewall software and the TCP/IP stack). The software firewall 
would probably intercept messages and process them before the rest of the operating 
system gets them. This means that optimisation concerning buffering and open 
connections could increase the speed of connections. Further investigation could include 
running the firewall on a separate machine to test the outcome. 
7.5.2.3 Encryption 
Encryption poses a substantially greater burden than merely tunnelling the traffic. 
Certain cryptographic methods produced definite performance degradation on FTP 
traffic, but HTTP performance improved. Deploying DES encryption created more than 
a 130% delay and 50% reduction in throughput for CHAP and EAP-TLS authentication 
methods. For stronger encryption only FTP traffic was degraded regardless of the user 
authentication methods was used. Mixed results were found on traffic response time, 
with 8.1% increase for FTP and 13.4% improvement for HTTP accompanying CHAP 
authentication. FTP throughput decreased by 7.9%, and HTTP throughput improved by 
16%. The type of user authentication chosen also played a role when interacting with 
the encryption algorithm; when using digital certificates, there was no difference 
between encryption methods chosen. 
7.5.2.4 Interaction of Authentication and Encryption 
Combing different authentication methods with encryption produced significant impacts 
on performance. If same encryption method is deployed, e.g. DES, then the choice of 
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user authentication methods created substantial performance overheads and longer 
response times regardless of the encryption algorithm used. For DES, FTP is affected 
more than double the HTTP amount at a 35.8 % delay and 31.3 % drop in throughput. 
But for 3DES, using CHAP or EAP-TLS authentication produced similar effects. 
7.5.3 Overall Performance 
These results are limited to a single cell WLAN. Integrating these models with a 
backbone network would provide further information on different traffic loads 
transferred over the network. 
 
The two measured indicators of performance, throughput and response time were 
affected by the security mechanisms deployed. We can generalise our findings in the 
following points (for more details, see Table 7-10): 
 Deploying MAC and WEP authentication created no overheads. 
 Different authentication methods created different levels of performance 
overhead; EAP-TLS generated the longest delay and decreased 
throughput. A comparison of the authentication mechanisms can be 
summarised as follows: 
ü  EAP-TLS> EAP-MD5/CHAP>WEP>MAC 
 Tunnelling produced large overheads; IPSec overheads > PPTP 
overheads. 
 WEP encryption impact on performance varied; key length affected only 
response times. However, when WEP encryption was used in conjunction 
with 802.1X-based authentication, network performance was dramatically 
degraded. 
 Deploying DES cryptographic methods introduced large overheads, 
however, there was not much difference between 3DES and DES, 
especially when used with a certificate-based authentication. 
 The interaction of authentication and encryption generated different 
results from adding encryption to the same authentication methods for 
FTP and HTTP traffic. EAP-TLS produced the most adverse impact. 
 Firewall deployment (router integrated) provided some interesting results. 
Performance was actually improved instead of degraded. Further 
investigation is required. 
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FTP HTTP FTP HTTP FTP HTTP FTP HTTP 
Authentication         
- MAC 0 0 0 0     
- WEP 0 <10 0 <10     
- EAP-MD5 > WEP >100 <50 50-
100 
50<     
-EAP-TLS > MD5/CHAP <50 <10 <10 <10 <50 <50 <50 <50 
Tunneling         





-IPSec > PPTP     <10 <10 0 0 
Firewall         
- PPTP     Imp Imp Imp Imp 
- IPSec     Imp Imp Imp Imp 
Encryption         
-WEP (40-bit)  0 Imp. 0 Imp.     
-WEP 40-bit vs 128-bit <50 0 <50 0     
-EAP-MD5 with WEP 100< 100< <50 <50     
- EAP-TLS with WEP 100< 100< <50 <50     












-3DES> DES with CHAP     <10 Imp <10 Imp. 
-3DES> DES with TLS     0 0 0 0 
Integrated 
Authentication 
 & Encryption 
        




    
-TLS-WEP vs MD5 WEP <10 0 <10 <10     
- TLS > CHAP with DES     <50 <50 <50 <50 
- TLS > CHAP with 3DES     <50 <50 <50 <50 
Imp = improve the network performance 
Table 7-10 Summary of Security Impact on Performance 
7.6 Summary 
Our experimental evaluation investigated the performance cost incurred with various 
security mechanisms, and found that the more secured a network became, the higher the 
performance impacted. The VPN model incurred more performance degradation than 
the 802.1X model as we expected; the VPN model provided end-to-end security with 
double authentication (device and user), stronger encryption method, better key 
management, and tunnelling technology. The general pattern for type of application 
protocols carried over a network also followed our expectation that request-reply 
(HTTP) application created more performance overheads than the FTP, as the 
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interaction between two endpoints increased due to security negotiation and 
management. Our evaluation on different security levels showed that the higher the 
security level got (as the network became more secured), the greater the performance 
cost generated, except in the case of MAC address authentication, WEP authentication 
and encryption (40-bit), a firewall, and 3DES encryption in the VPN model. Further 
research would be required on investigating software or hardware firewall’s effect on 
the network, and different traffic characteristics for different cryptographic methods. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 Wireless Security Insurance  
Arbaugh [Goth, 2002] provided the insight on security that “the biggest problem with 
security is management : how to do it well, how to do it consistently, and how to make it 
easy on your IT staff. It is not the underpinning of cryptography, not deciding to run 
security at layer 2 or layer 3, but how do you manage all of this?” Our experimental 
results quantified the security impact on performance; however, to maintain a secured 
wireless network, security management strategies must be constructed and enforced. In 
this chapter, we propose a novel way to evaluate security as “insurance policies” (see 
Section 4.4), thus creating a positive cycle for enforcing standard security practices. The 
performance impact results from our experiments act as one of the insurance policy 
variables in assessing network security. 
 
When organisations plan network security strategies, their particular organisational 
environments determine the security mechanism or combination of mechanisms they 
will choose. Security policies can be written like insurance policies, and various factors 
include company size, value of assets, priority of security, and performance cost. This 
chapter illustrates how insurance policies could be constructed in terms of performance 
overheads. Various scenarios demonstrate how security insurance policies can be 
applied to organisations deploying wireless networks.  
8.1 Scope of the Security Insurance Concept 
Providing security insurance can generate business opportunities. Organisations 
mitigate risk at a level that insurance companies find acceptable. Insurance companies 
evaluate the value of a company’s assets to be protected and the residual value of risk. 
Security insurance policies will be based on the insurance companies’ assessments and 
evaluation, and sufficient to cover the network security risk. Following this concept, 
active security monitoring and management is required, which further strengthen a 
company’s network security against threats and attacks. 
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The security insurance framework to be established will contain various factors, 
including the value of a company’s assets, a company’s reputation, company size, 
security, the performance cost, end-user characteristics (level of IT knowledge, 
behaviour 25  etc.), and existing network resources (software and hardware) that have 
been deployed by a company. Insurance companies will assess these requirements to 
provide security insurance to organisations. A security insurance evaluation process is 
described in Figure 8-1. The proposed wireless security insurance strategies in this 
study investigated only two components, security policies and performance cost. Other 







































Figure 8-1 Security Insurance Evaluation Process 
8.2 Wireless Security Policies 
There are several factors that would be necessary to issue security insurance. The 
factors defined in this section were chosen to provide a template for wireless security 
polices. Table 8-1 provides a WLAN security policy template. The template represents 
various security policies that can be implemented for an organisation’s WLAN 
networks. Factors considered in the template include: 
                                                 
25 If end-users tend to abuse of a company’s information resources, a higher premium may be required. 
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 Policy number: provides an index number for ordering the policies. 
 Protection type: provides information on which policy belong to what 
risk mitigation. This is generalised from Section 3.3 and Chapter 5. There 
are three types of protection provided in the template: basic, 802.1X and 
VPN models. Policy numbers 1 to 6 are the default policies, which must 
be deployed regardless of type of security. 
 Security priority of the policy: states the quality of security offered by 
each policy. The priority ranges from level 1 (lowest) to level 3 (highest). 
The higher the security priority levels are associated with stronger 
protection. 
 Policy description: details the content of the security policy. These 
descriptions are based on the risk countermeasures discussed in Chapter 3 
and our security levels for the 802.1X and the VPN models defined in 
Chapter 5. 
 Performance cost: that is associated with each policy. The performance 
cost is calculated in terms of a percentage of throughputs; this number is 
based on the average throughput associated with FTP and HTTP, as 
evaluated in Section 7.4. If certain security policies are more time 
sensitive, they will be indicated by symbols in the template. Some security 
policies require other policies to be activated in order for them to work, 
thus, letter “P” indicate which policy number needs to be incorporated 
when calculating performance degradation. 
 
This template provides only a limited view, as the parameters considered in this 
research concentrated on security techniques and performance. Other parameters such 
as value of a company’s assets, end-user characteristics, and multiple WLANs have not 
been evaluated. Note that firewalls are not included in the 802.1X and VPN model 










Policy Description Perf. 
Cost 
(%) 
1 1 Change default passwords for accessing access points. 0 
2 1 Change access points’ SSIDs so that they do not reflect obvious 
names, e.g. function of an AP, but a mixture of departments, division, or 
organisational policy. 
0 
3 1 Physical protection of APs and wireless NIC cards by keeping an 
inventory list. 0 
4 1 Change or disable SNMP parameters and other non-essential 
management functions. 0 
5 1 Change and deploy channel settings to ensure minimum interferences. 0 
6 1 Update wireless devices with the latest patches to ensure device 
integrity. 0 









Deploy MAC address authentication.  0 
10 1 Enable WEP authentications. 0 
11 1 Deploy WEP encryption with 40-bit key length. -2.6 
12 2 Deploy WEP encryption with 128-bit key length. 8.3 
13 2 Implement 802.1X framework with EAP-MD5 authentication method. 42.3
†
 
14 3 Implement 802.1X framework with EAP-TLS authentication. EAP-TLS is 
based on PKI technology and provides enhanced key management. 7.5 + P13 







3 Deploy WEP encryption with 802.1X authentication method EAP-TLS. 45.8
?  
17 2 Deploy PPTP tunnelling with CHAP authentication for a Layer 2 VPN. 59.4
F
 
18 2 Deploy L2TP/IPSec tunnelling with CHAP authentication. P17 
19 3 Deploy L2TP/IPSec tunnelling with EAP-TLS authentication. 17.8 + P18 
















3 Adding 3DES encryption onto IPSec-based VPN with EAP-TLS user 
authentication. P21 
? - normal firewall considerations apply; the cost is specific to this research using a s oftware firewall/router. 
†- If the nature of traffic is FTP, a more severe impact is experienced. 
? - if the nature of traffic is HTTP, a more severe impact is experienced. 
F - time sensitive impact as well. 
P- the policy number (and its associated cost). 
Table 8-1 A Wireless Security Policy Template 
8.3 Scenarios 
The following scenarios are examples of how the wireless security policies described in 
Table 8-1 could work if insurance companies consider providing IT security insurance 
for WLANs. The company sizes are selected from Section 4.3. Some of the network 
performance degradation may seem large, however note that network performance 
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degradation is just one of the variables in evaluating the security insurance 
requirements. 
To maintain a company’s network performance at the base level (before applying the 
security mechanisms), there is a cost to the company, such as the cost of upgrading 
equipment (servers, workstations), faster network (upgrading to 802.11a), and so on. 
These costs are in addition to the  direct cost of purchasing the security tools, which 
includes hardware, software, and the staff to maintain and enforce the security 
implemented on the network. 
8.3.1 Small Company 
ABC is a small retailing company and has a small WLAN in place. The owner currently 
has no security protection mechanism in place. After evaluating the value of the 
company’s assets protected by the network security, the insurance company required the 
owner to apply the following security policies: 
 Basic protection type (policy numbers 1 to 6) as these policies are used 
for basic security management. No performance degradation will be 
experienced. No DHCP policy is required, as the company’s size is small. 
 802.1X model protection (policy numbers 9-10, and 12), which provides 
MAC address, and WEP authentication and encryption (128-bit). The 
network performance throughput would be decreased by 5.7 %. As the 
company’s asset value does not require strong security mechanisms, basic 
defence tools such as MAC address and WEP protection are sufficient. 
 The overall performance degradation is 5.7 %. No additional security 
tools that must be purchased, because MAC addresses and WEP 
protection can be activated in the AP26. User training would be minimal, 
and maintenance costs are small, but would require a part-time staff to 
keep updated MAC addresses and software patches. 
8.3.2 Medium Company 
IJK is a medium-sized hardware manufacturer, and has deployed a few APs in the 
factory. Product designs and other valuable information are usually transmitted over the 
air. The company has consulted with an insurance company on mitigating their risks 
                                                 
26If the APs currently deployed do not provide these mechanisms, the company should consider 
purchasing high-end wireless products if the cost of buying these products justifies the security 
protection. 
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against attacks. After its evaluation, the insurance company suggested the following 
policies: 
 Basic protection type (policy numbers 1 to 8), DHCP is required to 
provide easier IP address issuing. A firewall must be placed at the edge of 
the company’s core network, separating wired and wireless networks. The 
network performance impact might result in a 25% increased in 
throughput (see Table 8-1). 
 802.1X model protection type (policy numbers 9, 14, and 15) to provide 
MAC address authentication, and EAP-TLS authentication with WEP 
encryption. MAC address authentication is used on wireless devices, and 
EAP-TLS for user certificates. The network performance degradation that 
would be experienced is 95.6%. PKI is selected because company data is 
valuable, and certificates provide better access control than EAP-MD5.  
 The overall performance impact on the network is a decrease of 70.6%. 
IT staff need to be trained in operating the company’s own certificate and 
RADIUS servers, and applying remote access policies. Outsourcing a 
certificate server provider may be considered, such as VeriSign27, if the 
company is considering e-commerce for the future and the subscription fee 
justifies its use. User learning curves would not be high as digital 
certificates, once installed, provide automatic sign- in. 
 The VPN Model was not recommended as creating tunnels generates high 
performance overheads, which are not efficient in transmitting multimedia 
data such as product designs. 
8.3.3 Large Company 
Organisation QRS is a large financial institution, and has deployed several WLANs. Its 
data transmission must be secured to protect the sensitive documents being transferred 
across the organisation. It decides to insure the value of its data and asks an insurance 
company to provide an assessment.  
 
After the assessment, the insurance company proposes the following policies: 
 Basic protection type (policy numbers 1-8), because the organisation has 
a large number of wireless users, DHCP is required to issue IP addresses, 
                                                 
27 A commercial certificate authority providing public -key infrastructure (PKI) security solutions, see 
www.verisign.com. 
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as stated in policy number 7. Furthermore, installing firewalls between 
departments (policy number 8) is a necessity, which might increase the 
network throughput by 25%. 
 VPN model protection type (policy numbers 19 and 23) deploys IPSec 
tunnelling with certificate authentication (EAP-TLS) and the strongest 
encryption method, 3DES. These selections provide the strongest data 
protection. This would produce network throughput degradation of 
136.6%. 
 The overall performance impact on the network would be a decrease of 
111.6%. User and IT staff training are crucial to ensure an effective use of 
IPSec technology. Operating IPSec based VPN requires a level of 
sophistication from IT staff, such as providing tunnelling, and configuring 
IPSec policies. There is an additional cost of purchasing security products. 
Outsourcing IT expertise may be considered. 
8.4 Summary 
The security insurance concept introduced in Chapter 4 has been applied here to 
WLAN. Our analysis has led us to propose a template for wireless security policies in 
terms of performance cost. The security policies are treated as a factor in determining 
insurance requirements with performance cost as one of the premium indicators. Other 
factors that shape the premium calculation, such as the value of a company’s assets and 
company’s reputation, have not been selected as they are beyond our research scope. 
Various examples in Section 8.2 show how these policies might work to provide better 
security and generate business opportunities in the industry. Business sectors can use 
this template as an indicator of their network security and performance tradeoffs, while 




CHAPTER 9  
Conclusions 
Our research quantified the tradeoffs between performance and security of 802.11 
WLANs. The data show that security mechanisms produce performance overheads in 
both wired (from prior research) and wireless networks (from our experiments). 
However, these overheads vary widely, and depend upon the security architectures and 
their related configuration options. 
 
We defined two AAA-integrated models to secure 802.11b networks. These two models 
were constructed with various security layers. The 802.1X model includes MAC 
address authentication, WEP authentication and encryption, and 802.1X EAP-MD5 and 
EAP-TLS authentication methods. The VPN model is based on IPSec technology, and 
contains a firewall, tunnelling, PKI device authentication, CHAP and EAP-TLS user 
authentication, and DES and 3DES encryption algorithms. The FTP and HTTP traffic 
types were selected to demonstrate the difference between bulk-file and request-reply 
transfers. The general pattern we found in the experiments was that the stronger the 
security mechanism implemented, the poorer the network performance. In other words, 
as the level of security increases, WLAN performance degrades, although such 
performance penalties varied widely. 
9.1 Research Results 
The VPN model offered end-to-end security, which was superior to the 802.1X model 
and doubled the response time and reduced throughput by one-third. However, the level 
of complexity for security implementation increased when the VPN model was 
deployed. The visible performance degradation was experienced when the VPN model 
was deployed using tunnelling, the combined effect of device- and user-authentication, 
and a stronger encryption algorithm. Unless strong protection is required (such as 
classified government or military data), organisations should implement the 802.1X 
model as it offers simpler network management and requires fewer network resources at 
the network boundary. 
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The type of traffic used for data transfer influenced the results. A comparison between 
FTP and HTTP traffic found that HTTP traffic created greater overheads with longer 
response times than FTP traffic. Due to the nature of the HTTP traffic, the results 
illustrated our assumption that as the number and size of authentication and 
management frames increased in interactive applications, users would experience 
extended delays and decreased throughput.  
 
Our ANOVA analysis confirmed that security levels within each model produced 
different impacts on performance. Furthermore, most security mechanisms degraded 
network performance as the quality of the security protection increased. Certificate-
based authentication (EAP-TLS) significantly increased response times and decreased 
throughput more than password-based authentication (EAP-MD5/CHAP). WEP 
encryption (128-bit) produced a lower impact on a network than the DES or 3DES 
encryption methods. However, there were a few exceptions observed that produce no 
significant impact on performance, examples include MAC address authentication, 
WEP encryption (40-bit), WEP authentication, and 3DES encryption (when compared 
to DES encryption). Thus, these security mechanisms should be used whenever 
possible.  
 
Some unexpected results were observed when the software firewall was implemented 
which, in fact, resulted in improved network performance. Further research is required 
on the choice of software/hardware security device implementation, and at which point 
in the network path to provide IPSec protection.  
 
A novel concept of writing up security policies as one of the wireless security insurance 
requirements, using the size of performance degradation as part of the premium 
calculation, may provide business and security enhancement incentives. If IT security 
can be insured, a business has an incentive, if it regards its data as critical or valuable, to 
deploy the best security it can afford thus minimising its risks and insurance costs. On 
the other hand, insurance companies will provide insurance if certain security criteria 
are met. These business opportunities can generate revenues for insurance companies, 
thus leading them to demand stronger security protection to avoid losses. The wireless 
security policy template we constructed in Table 8-1 illustrates how these security 
policies can be used in various scenarios. We proposed security policies and 
performance degradation cost (impacted by security) as some of the requirements to 
construct wireless security insurance; other parameters include a company’s reputation, 
the value of company assets, and company size.  
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9.2 Limitations 
IT security requires both human intervention and technical support to provide a secure 
network solution. This research focused on the technical support for a secured wireless 
network. The human aspect is equally important but will not be investigated due to the 
limited timeframe and resources. 
 
This study examined only one type of wireless network, the 802.11 standard; the results 
of this study might not be applicable to all types of wireless networks. One limitation of 
this research was the use of the infrastructure mode of the 802.11 standards. This might 
preclude generalisation of these performance or security results to the ad-hoc mode of 
802.11 wireless networks (see Section 2.2.1). We assume that many organisations 
deploying a WLAN use the infrastructure mode design. Network traffic generated 
during the experiment is assumed to mimic real world traffic flow. 
 
In general, there are several limitations associated with experiments. Experiments are 
tested in a confined environment, which may not simulate the real world. Real world 
factors such as environmental effects are important in wireless networks, because radio 
frequency transmission is influenced by other technologies operating in the same 
frequency band, such as microwaves, and weather conditions. These interferences may 
affect the performance results of a wireless network.  
 
One inherent limitation is using vendor-specific equipment. Different vendors provide 
different capabilities, and as prior literature has shown [Avery, 2001], different 
hardware can affect performance. 
 
The experiments conducted had a single-cell design with a single client to server 
communication route. Therefore, multiple clients or multi-cells design using multiple 
APs are beyond the scope of this research. By operating with one client, the parameter 
of network congestion has not been taken into account. 
 
The characteristic of FTP and HTTP application protocols provide different file sizes 
thus direct comparison will show limited results.  
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9.3 Future Work 
As wireless network access grows, new business opportunities will be created. M-
commerce may be the next major enhancement to e-commerce. The advantage of 
increasing mobility will lead to stronger demand for QoS, and simpler roaming structure 
at a secured connection.  
 
Our research was limited to a single client and server pair operating in a single cell, and 
future work could incorporate inter-cell or inter-AP support for single and multiple 
users. As mobility increases from WLANs to WWANs (handoffs between the two), the 
ability to maintain a secured connection without reassociation and reauthentication as a 
user roams from one network to another should be investigated. To further widen the 
scope, experiments using multimedia data types at various sizes could be conducted.  
 
Future research can explore the security insurance policy concept, such as integrating 
parameters other than performance cost. An area to be investigated is the interactions 
between different business models and insurance assessments. 
 
Another area to be investigated is the accounting and billing consideration against 
security support. Experiments can be carried on the interactions between accounting and 
security for wireless users accessing secured public WLANs. Deploying a PBNM 
framework can enhance security as it provides automatic network resource 
configuration through high- level policies. PBNM may be integrated with a usage-based 
fee scheme to provide dynamic network auditing and management for a service provider 
[Geng et al., 2002]. Users will demand higher security, thus leading to better security 









Appendix B Configuration Procedures 
1. Testbed System Requirements 
Ø Server 
Operating System: Windows 2000 Advanced Server with Service Pack 3 
Hardware:  
Processor - AMD Athlon XP 1600+ 1.40GHz  
Memory - 512 MB RAM 
Network Card - Intel Pro/100 S Desktop network card 
Software: 
Orinoco AP-2000 software version 1.4 variant 1.47 
Solariswind TFTP version 3 
Ethereal version 0.9.5 
Ø Client 
Operating System: Windows XP Professional 2002  
Hardware:  
Processor - AMD Athlon XP 1600+ 1.40GHz  
Memory- 512 MB of RAM 
Network Cards - Intel Pro/100 S Desktop network card 
Orinoco USB client 
Software: 
Orinoco USB client driver 
Orinoco Client Manager version 1.7 
WinHTTrack version 3.2 




Orinoco built- in functions 
Ø Firewall 
Operating System:  Windows 2000 Advanced Server with Service Pack 3 
Software: 
Network ICE BlackICE version 2.9 
Microsoft RAS - configure this machine as a router as well. 
2. Server Functionality Enabling 
This assumes the AD and DNS Server has already been enabled and has hotfixes of 
Q304347, Q304697, and Q30626028 [Microsoft, 2002c]. 
                                                 





- Click on Property and edit Default Group Policy (domain). 
- Create user groups according to their security functions, e.g. Wireless and VPN 
Groups. 
? In Windows Configuration > enable reversible encrypted password29 (see 
Figure b-1). 
Figure b-1 Default Group Policy 
? In the PKI configuration > enable automatic machine/computer 
certificates for automatic issuing of computer certificate. 
Ø DNS Server 
-Enable dynamic updates for zone in the Property section. 
-Change to native mode if possible (better integration with remote access policies). 
Ø Certificate Authority (CA) Server 
- If the organisation has no previous CA in place, use Microsoft certificate server 
provided in the administrative tools. 
- Choose root CA if that is the organisation’s preferred CA, else choose the other 
options such as a child or sub domain CA from the list. 
- Users can request certificates via the web interface before either 802.1X or 
VPN is in place30. 
                                                 
29 If users already exist in other groups, reset password and reissue digital certificates afterwards. 
30 Or users may choose to request certificates via wired connection. 
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Ø IAS (RADIUS server) [Microsoft, 2000b, 2002a-b]  
- Accept RAS clients of (a) AP-2000 and (b) VPN server. 
- Configure Client details with (a) and (b)’s information (see Figure b-2). 
Figure b-2 RADIUS Client Configuration  
- Configure Remote Access Policy (see Appendix C). Please note if you use the 
VPN server (RAS in Microsoft platform), you should still construct remote 
access policy in IAS instead of RAS. 
Ø IIS server 
-  Enable IIS from Administrative tools; it provides FTP and Web server. 
-  For FTP server, select the timeout, e.g. 900 seconds. 
- For Web server, administrators can provide unlimited timeout. 
2.1 802.1X Model Configuration 
Figure b-3 Logical Components and IP address issuing 
Ø Client [Microsoft, 2002c-d] 
- Click WLAN connections’ Property >select Authentication menu 
? WEP authentication (if enabled) becomes Shared key authentication. 
? WEP encryption provided either when the administrator has configured 
the WLAN NIC in advance or the user types in the secret key. 
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! Four keys can be selected at AP; therefore, if the user manually 
types in the password (thus automatic password option is not on), 
the user will need to select the right key number ranging from 0-
3 (1-4 in AP). 
 
 
Figure WEP and Windows XP 
- Click Property on the WLAN connection >select 802.1X panel >select either 
Certificate (smartcard) or MD5. 
? If certificate is selected > select the CA to be trusted and enable verify 
server’s certificate (see Figure b-4). 
! After the network is connected, user will be automatically logged 
in to the organisation’s network. 
Figure b-4 802.1X and Windows XP 
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? If MD5 is selected when the wireless network is connected, a screen will 
appear asking the user to enter username and password (see Figure b-5). 
If the user is pre-Windows2000, use domain\user, else user@domain 
username. 
 
Figure b-5 EAP-MD5 Connection 
Ø Access Point31 
- For using the basic 802.11 security: 
? Enable MAC address authentication and type in clients’ NICs’ MACs. 
? For WEP authentication, select only the secret key number (see Figure b-
6). 
? Enable WEP encryption and select the secret key number. 
 
Figure b-6 WEP and AP-2000 
                                                 
31 See Orinoco AP-2000 Guidebook. 
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- For the 802.1X standard protection (use with RADIUS, see [Microsoft, 
Troubleshooting Windows XP IEEE 802.11 Wireless Access, 2002] for 
troubleshooting): 
? For 802.1X authentication select only “802.1X mode”32: 
! Disable Encryption  
! Disable Deny unencrypted 
! Select key number 1 
? For 802.1X authentication and WEP encryption using “Mixed mode”: 
! Enable encryption and “deny encryption” 
! Use key number 1 
? Enable RADIUS sever (see Figure b-7) 
 
Figure b-7 RADIUS and AP-2000 
Ø RADIUS Server 
- Configure the RADIUS client with AP’s IP address, shared secret, and allow digital 
signature. 
- See remote policy configuration in Appendix C. 
                                                 
32 Can select “Mixed mode” as long as encryption is not enabled. 
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2.2 VPN Model Configuration 
Figure b-8 Logical Components and IP address Issuing 
Ø Client (Different Subnetwork) 
- First dial- in WLAN connection (WEP and 802.1X disabled). 
- Second dial- in VPN connection (IPSec and PPTP) with selected authentication and 
encryption (see Figure b-9 and b-10). For more information see Appendix C. 
 
Figure b-9 IPSec EAP-TLS Dial-In 
 116
Figure b-10 PPTP CHAP Dial-in 
- Enable IPSec Policy Management (if domain controlled then domain priority 
overrides local IPSec configuration). See Appendix C. 
Ø Access Point 
- Disable RADIUS 
- Disable WEP encryption 
Ø IAS (RADIUS Sever) 
- Change RADIUS client to RAS, which uses IP addresses of 192.168.10.1. 
Ø RAS (VPN Server) 
- Configure Property with IP address, shared secret (see Figure b-11). 
- Provide static IP address pool, such as 193.168.10.0-193.168.10.10, to be issued to 
users when access has been granted. 
    - Set security options. 




Figure b-11 RAS/VPN Server Property 
Ø IPSec Policy Management 
- In the AD’s Default Group Policy, enable IPSec Policy (default or customised). 
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Appendix C Remote Policy Activation 
The following policies are configured in IAS remote access policies. Be sure the 
Account and Dial- in panels in users’ Property in the AD has either “allow” or “control 
through remote policy” enabled (see Figure c-1). 
Figure c-1 User Property in AD 
Add new remote access policy and then edit the “Profile” for security and other 
configurations. Remove the default remote access policy provided at the start. 
1. 802.1X Model Policy Activation (see Figure c-2) 
Ø Wireless via EAP-MD5 Enabled Policy 
? Add Wireless group or other groups that while using the WLAN. 
? Add RADIUS as the client-vendor specific support. 
? Select 802.11 as the NAS port. 
? For authentication selects EAP-MD5 (enable reversible encrypted 
password). 
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Figure c-2 802.1X Policy Example in IAS  
Ø Wireless via EAP-TLS enabled Policy 
? Add Wireless group or other groups that should be using the WLAN 
? Add RADIUS as the client-vendor specific support 
? Select 802.11 as NAS port 
? For authentication selects EAP-TLS 
1. VPN Model Policy Activation 
We constructed a customised IPSec Policy to provide an HMAC-SHA1 hashing 
function; if users wish to use HMAC-MD5, there is no need to construct an IPSec 
Policy. Microsoft provides an IPSec policy, L2TP Rule, which is automatically created 
on remote RAS and L2TP/IPSec Dial- in. Administrators will need to disable this rule if 
customised policy configuration is desired (see Microsoft Knowledge Base Q310109). 
1.1 IPSec Policy 
The policy is called SecureRemote for the server and the client, and contains: 
? A customised Enforce filter for all remote traffic with certificate-based 
authentication (see Figure c-3 for Policy Configuration and Figure c-4 
for IPSec filter [Microsoft, 1999a, 2001]). 
! ESP [3DES, HMAC-SHA1] 
! ESP [DES, HMAC-SHA1] 
! ESP [No Confidentiality, HMAC-SHA1] 
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? Another filter to permit ICMP (ping) traffic. 
 
Figure c-3 IPSec Policy Configuration 
Figure c-4 IPSec Filter 
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1.2 Remote Access Policy 
Ø VPN Access Via IPSec Policy (Figure c-5) 
? Add VPN group or other groups that will use the WLAN. 
? Add RADIUS as the client-vendor specific support. 
? Select VPN as the NAS port and L2TP/IPSec as tunnelling technology. 
? For authentication, select CHAP and EAP-TLS (other options can be 
selected if desired). 
? For encryption allow all ranges from No (0), Basic (40-bit MPPE), 
Strong (56-bit MPPE, DES) to Strongest (128-bit MPPE, 3DES). 
Figure c-5 VPN Policy and Property 
Ø VPN Access Via PPTP Policy 
? Add VPN group or other groups that will use the WLAN. 
? Add RADIUS as the client-vendor specific support. 
? Select VPN as the NAS port and PPTP as tunnelling technology. 
? For authentication select CHAP and EAP-TLS (other options can be 
selected if desired). 
? For encryption allow all ranges from No (0), Basic (40-bit MPPE), 
Strong (56-bit MPPE, DES) to Strongest (128-bit MPPE, 3DES). 
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Acronyms and Abbreviations 
NUMBER 
1G First Generation  
2G Second Generation  
3DES Triple Data Encryption Standard  
3G Third Generation  
A 
AAA Authentication, Authorisation, and Accounting 
ACK Acknowledgment 
ACL Access Control List  
AD Active Directory 
AES Advanced Encryption Standard  
AH Authentication Header  
AMPS Advanced Mobile Phone System  
AP Access Point  
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
AS Authentication Server 
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
B 
BSS Basic Service Set  
C 
CCK Complementary Code Keying 
CDP Cisco Discovery Protocol 
CHAP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol 
CRC Checksum 
CDMA Code Division Multiple Access  
CHAP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol 
COPS Common Open Policy Service 
CSMA/CA Carrier Senses Multiple Access with Collusion Avoidance 
CTS Clear To Send 
D 
DCF Distributed Coordination Function 
DF Degree of Freedom 
DIAMETER  
DoS Denial of Service 
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service  
DES Data Encryption Standard  
DHCP Dynamic Host Control Protocol  
DNS Domain Name Server 
DS Distribution System 
DSSS Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum  
E 
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol  
EAPOL EAP over LAN 
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EAPOW EAP over Wireless 
EAP-SRP EAP Secure Remote Password 
E-commerce Electronic Commerce 
ESN Enhanced Security Network 
ESP Encapsulating Security Protocol  
ESS Extended Service Set  
ETSI European Telecommunications Standard Institute  
F 
FDMA Frequency Division Multiple Access  
FHSS Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum  
FTP File Transfer Protocol 
G 
GHz Gigahertz  
GPRS General Packet Radio  
GPS Global Positioning System  
GRE Generic Routing Encapsulation 
GSM Global System for Mobile  
H 
HiperLAN High Performance Radio LAN 
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol  
HMAC Hashed Message Authenticated Code 
HR/DSSS High Rate DSSS 
I 
IAPP Inter-Access Point Protocol 
IAS Internet Authentication Server 
IBSS Interdependent Basic Service Set  
ICV Integrity Check Value 
IDS Intrusion Detection System  
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers  
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force  
IIS Internet Information Service 
IKE Internet Key Exchange  
IP Internet Protocol  
IPSec Internet Protocol Security  
IR Infrared  
IAS Internet Authentication Service 
ISAKMP Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol 
ISM Industrial, Scientific, and Medical  
ISO International Organization for Standardization  
ISP Internet Service Provider 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
IV Initialisation Vector  
K 
Kbps Kilobits per second  
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L 
LLC Logical Link Layer 
L2TP Layer 2 Tunnelling Protocol  
LAN Local Area Network  
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol  
M 
MAC Medium Access Control  
MAN Metropolitan Area Network 
Mbps Megabits per second  
M-commerce Mobile Commerce 
MD Message Digest  
MHz Megahertz  
MIB Management Information Base 
MPEG Multimedia P 
MPPE Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption 
MS-CHAP Microsoft CHAP  
N 
NAS Network Access Server 
NAT Network Address Translation 
NIC Network Interface Card  
O 
OFDM Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing  
OSI Open Systems Interconnection  
OTP One Time Password  
P 
PAE Port Access Entity 
PAP Password Authentication Protocol 
PAN Personal Area Network  
PBNM Policy Based Network Management 
PC Personal Computer 
PCF Point Coordination Function 
PDA Personal Digital Assistant  
PDC Personal Digital Communication 
PHY Physical Layer  
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards  
PKI Public Key Infrastructure  
PKIX Public-Key Infrastructure X.509 
PPP Point-to-Point Protocol 
PPTP Point-to-Point Tunnelling Protocol  
PRNG Pseudorandom Number Generator 
Q 
QoS Quality of Service 
R 
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial- in User Service  
RAS Remote Access Server 
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RC 4 Rivest Cipher 4 
RF Radio Frequency  
RFC Request for Comment  
ROI Return On Investment 
RSA Rivest Shamir Adelman  
RTS Request To Send 
S 
SA Security Association 
SHA Secure Hashed Algorithm 
SIG Special Interest Group  
S/MIME Secure Multi-Purpose Internet Mail Extensions 
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol  
SPAP Shiva Password Authentication Protocol 
SRP Secure Remote Password 
SSID Service Set Identifier  
SSL Secure Sockets Layer  
SSH Secure Shell  
STA Station 
STP Spanning Tree Protocol 
T 
TA Transmitter Address 
TACAS Terminal Access Controller Access Control System 
TCP Transmission Control Protocol  
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access 
TFTP Trivial File Transfer Protocol  
TG Task Group   
TK Temporal Key 
TKIP Temporal Key Integrity Protocol  
TLS Transport Layer Security  
TTLS Tunnelled TLS 
U 
UDP User Datagram Protocol 
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service  
V 
VPN Virtual Private Network  
W 
WDMZ Wireless Demilitarised Zone 
WECA Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (Now known as Wi-Fi Alliance) 
WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy  
WEP2 Wired Equivalent Privacy 2  
Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity  
Wi-Fi Alliance Wireless Fidelity Alliance 
WIP Work in Progress 
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network  
WPAN Wireless Personal Area Network 
WWAN Wireless Wide Area Network 
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